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Foreword 
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air 
Force Institute of Technology established the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering (AF 
CSE) at its Wright Patterson AFB campus in 2003.  With academic oversight by a subcommittee 
on Systems Engineering (SE), chaired by then Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex Levis, the AF 
CSE was tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept definition, 
acquisition, and sustainment.  The committee drafted an initial case outline and learning 
objectives, and suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall analysis. 
 
The Department of Defense is exponentially increasing the acquisition of joint complex 
systems that deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter.  Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining 
robust, high-quality, affordable solutions.  The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the 
need to mature a sound systems engineering process throughout the Air Force.  Gaining an 
understanding of the past and distilling learning principles that are then shared with others 
through our formal education and practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous 
improvement. 
 
The AF CSE has published seven case studies thus far including the; C-5A, F-111, 
Hubble Telescope, Theater Battle Management Core System, B-2, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile, and Global Positioning System.  All case studies are available on the AF CSE website 
[http://www.afit.edu/cse].  These cases support academic instruction on SE within military 
service academies, civilian and military graduate schools, industry continuing education 
programs, and those practicing SE in the field.  Each of the case studies is comprised of elements 
of success as well as examples of SE decisions that, in hindsight, were not optimal.  Both types 
of examples are useful for learning.  Plans exist for future case studies on the Peacekeeper ICBM 
and NASA’s International Space Station. 
 
Along with discovering historical facts we have conducted key interviews with program 
managers and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the various 
prime and subcontractors.  From this information we have concluded that the discipline needed 
to implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to 
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions.  We look forward to your 
comments on this A-10 “Warthog” case study and our other AF CSE published studies. 
 
    GEORGE E. MOONEY, SES 
    Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering  
    Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government 
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1 Systems Engineering Principles 
1.1 General Systems Engineering Process 
The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver 
needed capabilities to the warfighter.  With a constant objective to improve and mature the 
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these 
technically complex systems.  A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on 
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of 
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature.  Systems engineering is the 
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that 
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance.  The process must operate effectively with 
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the 
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost 
and schedule constraints.  The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses 
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures.  The process also changes over the 
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the 
conduct of past programs.  Systems engineering has a long history.  Examples can be found 
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as 
well as poorly applied, but well defined processes.  Throughout the many decades during which 
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools 
have been developed, documented, and applied.   
 
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging 
during any system program development.  First, system development must proceed from a well-
developed set of requirements.  Secondly, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, 
the system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components.  And 
third, the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities 
in all intended environments.  However, system requirements are not unchangeable.  As the 
system design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive 
to satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying 
the requirements or set of requirements.   
 
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process to 
establish the system architecture.  These architectural artifacts can depict any new system, legacy 
system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level 
behavior and performance.  Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and 
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage.  System and subsystem design follows 
the functional architecture.  System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky, 
expensive or time-consuming.  Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic 
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs.  
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce 
any high-risk technology areas.   
 
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical 
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems.  This is 
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applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex systems of systems.  Once a 
solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to 
ensure satisfaction of requirements.  Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs), and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, 
takes place well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs. 
 
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented in 
the literature.  These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution 
of the systems engineering process.  One can find systems engineering process definitions, 
guides, and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), 
Electronic Industries Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations.  They show the process 
as it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner.  One of these processes, long used by 
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted by Figure 1.  It should be noted that this 
model is not accomplished in a single pass.  This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the 
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces.  Formal models such as these did not 
appear until after the A-10 program had finished production, but many of the processes were 
already in practice with both the government and contractor workforces during the time of A-10 
development. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by DAU 
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1.2 DoD Directive 5000 documents 
During President Richard Nixon’s first term, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird faced 
congressional attempts to lower defense spending. The cause was Vietnam and the rising cost of 
defense acquisition, as well as emerging energy and environmental programs.  Laird and David 
Packard, his deputy, recognized the need for a mechanism to control and manage spending 
especially with the coming fiscal constraint. In May 1969 Packard formed the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to advise on the acquisition of major weapon systems. It 
was chartered to review major milestones as well as conduct occasional management reviews.   
One year later in 1970i, Packard issued a policy memorandum that was to become the foundation 
for the DoD 5000 series of documentsii which were first issued in 1971, and as of January 2008 
have been reissued 10 times.  The original purpose of DoD 5000 was to improve the 
management of acquisition programs and included policy to streamline management, 
decentralize execution and use appropriate management structures.1  The 1971 issue of DoD 
5000 established the following program considerations (abbreviated here) pertaining to 
progression of a program through the acquisition process.2
 
 
1. System need shall be clearly established in operational terms, with appropriate 
limits, and shall be challenged throughout the acquisition process…Wherever 
feasible, operational needs shall be satisfied through the use of existing military or 
commercial hardware… 
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of acquisition and 
ownership… Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost 
and schedule… 
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principle design parameter… 
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to assure that the 
demonstration of actual achievement is the pacing function… Schedules and 
funding profiles shall be structured to accommodate unforeseen problems and 
permit task accomplishment without unnecessary overlapping or concurrency. 
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed… Models, mock-ups and 
system hardware will be used to the greatest possible extent to increase 
confidence level. 
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible.  A determination of 
operational suitability, including logistics support requirements, will be made 
prior to large scale production commitments…  
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including risk…  
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor’s capability to 
develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis…  
9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide information 
which is essential to effective management control… Documentation shall be 
generated in the minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management 
needs. 
 
                                                 
i 1970 was also the year that the competitive prototype program for the A-X was approved; the program which 
eventually produced the A-10. 
ii DoD Directive 5000.1, and its accompanying DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
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The publication of DoD 5000 did not occur until a few months after the start of the A-10 
development program, but these policy ideas from the Office of the Secretary of Defense clearly 
influenced the A-10 program formulation.  In some respects, the A-10 program was a test bed for 
considerations such as design-to-cost, supportability in design, and competitive prototyping.  
While there have been variations and additions to these program considerations over the years 
since the first issuance of DoD 5000, the policy has retained many of the principles laid out in 
these requirements. 
 
1.3 Evolving Systems Engineering Process 
The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has 
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment.  Systems are becoming increasingly 
complex internally and more interconnected externally.  The process used to develop the aircraft 
and systems of the past was a process effective at the time.  It served the needs of the 
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory.  Notwithstanding, the 
cost and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-
managed programs and ones with less stellar execution.  As the nation entered the 1980s and 
1990s, large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule.  
Aerospace industry primes were becoming larger and more geographically and culturally 
distributed, and they worked diligently to establish common systems engineering practices across 
their enterprises.  However, these common practices must be understood and be useful both 
within the enterprise and across multiple corporations and vendor companies because of the 
mega-trend of teaming in large (and some small) programs.  It is essential that the systems 
engineering process effect integration, balance, allocation, and verification and be useful to the 
entire program team down to the design and interface level. 
 
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition; including system-of-systems (SoS) 
context, network centric warfare and operations, an increased attention to human systems 
integration, and the rapid growth in information technology.  These factors are driving a more 
sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and capable features, along with 
new tools and procedures.  One area of increased focus of the systems engineering process is the 
informational systems architectural definitions used during system analysis.  This process, 
described in the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF)3
1.4 Case Studies 
, emphasizes greater reliance on 
reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations, 
interoperability, information and data flows and network service-oriented characteristics.   
The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system and system-of-
systems projects is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past.  
Examination of systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can 
provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process.  It was this 
thinking that led to the initiation of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case study 
effort, as well as the present continuation of that effort. 
 
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems 
engineering principles.  They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term 
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consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success.  The 
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful 
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of 
alternatives at the program/system level.  In addition, the importance of using skills from 
multiple professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied 
functional data will be emphasized.  When they are taken together, the student is provided real-
world, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule and performance.   
 
The utilization and mis-utilization of systems engineering principles will be highlighted, 
with special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering 
practice.  Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition 
management and learning principles, to include whether: 
 
• every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer; 
• effective requirements analysis was applied; 
• consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards 
was applied; 
• effective test planning was accomplished; 
• there were effective major technical program reviews; 
• continuous risk assessments and management was implemented; 
• there were reliable cost estimates and policies; 
• they used disciplined application of configuration management; 
• a well defined system boundary was defined; 
• they used disciplined methodologies for complex systems ; 
• human systems integration was accomplished 
• problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the larger 
operational environment 
The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or system-
of-systems.  Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into detailed design 
requirements.  The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to the 
development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and balance the 
requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its life 
cycle.  Systems engineering case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to 
achieve this balance, which include: 
 
• The program manager/systems engineering interface between the operational user and 
developer (acquirer) essential to translate the needs into the performance 
requirements for the system and subsystems. 
• The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering 
to translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements. 
• The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems 
engineering practice of integration and balance. 
The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as 
both internal and external.  This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the 
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new 
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instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements or contractor and government 
staffing levels. 
 
1.5 Framework for Analysis 
The Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case studies will present learning principles 
specific to each program, but will utilize the Friedman-Sage framework4
 
 to organize the 
assessment of the application of the systems engineering process.  The systems engineering case 
studies published by AFIT employed the Friedman-Sage construct and matrix as the baseline 
assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems engineering process for the topic program.   
The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role in developing case 
studies in systems engineering and systems management, especially case studies that involve 
systems acquisition.  The Friedman-Sage framework is a nine row by three column matrix shown 
in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities 
Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
 1.  Contractor 
Responsibility 
2.  Shared  
Responsibility 
3.  Government 
Responsibility 
A.  Requirements Definition and 
Management 
   
B.  Systems Architecting and 
Conceptual Design 
   
C.  System and Subsystem Detailed 
Design and Implementation 
   
D.  Systems and Interface 
Integration 
   
E.  Validation and Verification    
F.  Deployment and Post 
Deployment 
   
G.  Life Cycle Support    
H.  Risk Assessment and 
Management  
   
I.  System and Program 
Management 
   
Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 1 represent phases in the systems 
engineering lifecycle: 
 
A. Requirements Definition and Management 
B. Systems Architecting and Conceptual Design 
C. Detailed System and Subsystem Design and Implementation 
D. Systems and Interface Integration 
E. Validation and Verification 
F. System Deployment and Post Deployment. 
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Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support: 
 
G. Life Cycle Support 
H. Risk management 
I. System and Program Management. 
 
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman–Sage framework suggests 
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle 
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the 
process.  Most other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix 
appear to be subsets of one of these.  The three columns of this two-dimensional framework 
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared 
responsibilities between the government and the contractor.  In teaching systems engineering in 
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and responsibilities of the 
government and industry activities.  While the government has responsibility in all 9 concept 
domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. "Hogs" in Flight 
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2 A-10 System Description 
2.1 Characteristics 
The A-10A Thunderbolt II, manufactured by Fairchild Republic Corp. between 1975 and 
1984, was specifically designed as a Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft.  It was named after 
another aircraft manufactured by Republic Aircraft, the P-47 Thunderbolt of WW II fame, but is 
commonly referred to by its nickname, “Warthog”, due to its unusual appearance (Figures 3,4).  
The A-10, which has survived several attempts of program cancellation and early retirement, is 
now projected to operate until 2028, well beyond its original requirement.  The A-10 has several 
configurations including the original A-10A, the A-10B, a two-seat version designed for all-
weather/night attack and pilot training (only one was produced), the OA-10A, used for forward 
air controller (FAC) missions, and the recent A-10C, an upgraded version of the A-10A.  A 
timeline of key events associated with the A-10 appears in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. External View Drawings of the A-10 Aircraft  
 
Figure 4. A-10 Inboard Profile 
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Table 2. Key A-10 Milestones and Events 
Year Milestone/Event 
7 Jun 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara directs that two new tactical aircraft, one of which is for CAS, should be developed 
7 Jan 1965 
The Secretary of Defense asks the Air Force to look at the requirements for 
a CAS aircraft for both the near-term and for long-term follow-on 
development 
Dec 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara authorizes the Air Force to acquire the A-7D, a modification of the Navy’s A-7, for the interim CAS role 
22 Dec 1966 HQ USAF issues a Requirements Action Directive (RAD) for a specialized CAS aircraft labeled the A-X that will satisfy long-term CAS objectives 
6 Mar 1967 A request for information (RFI) is sent to industry for A-X system studies 
19 Apr 1967 AFRDQ (Deputy for Studies and Analysis, Systems Engineering Group) completes the A-X Proposal 
1 Sep 1967 Industry completes its system studies 
1 Mar 1968 HQ USAF completes the initial Concept Formulation Package (CFP) for the A-X 
11 Dec 1968 A Development Concept Paper (DCP 23) is drafted for the A-X program 
6 Jun 1969 A Technical Development Plan (TDP) is developed for the A-X program by AFSC/ASD 
Sep 1969 
The Air Force recommends development of an internally-mounted 30 mm 
Gatling gun system (with associated rounds) as an integral component of 
the A-X aircraft 
6 Apr 1970 
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard approves DCP 23A and its 
competitive prototype approach (termed “Parallel Undocumented 
Development”) 
27 Apr 1970 The A-X System Program Office is established at Wright-Patterson AFB 
8 May 1970 A Request for Proposal (RFP) is released to 12 companies for the A-X 
7 Aug 1970 Six companies respond to the A-X RFP (Boeing, Cessna, Northrop, Fairchild Republic, General Dynamics and Lockheed) 
16 Nov 1970 The Air Force releases an RFP for the GAU-8/A 30-mm cannon to industry 
18 Dec 1970 Northrop (YA-9A) and Fairchild Republic (YA-10A) are chosen to build competitive prototypes for the A-X program 
Jun 1971 General Electric and Philco-Ford are awarded contracts for the competitive development of the GAU-8/A gun system and practice ammunition 
10 May 1972 First flight of the YA-10A occurs (competitive flight evaluation begins) 
20 May 1972 First flight of the YA-9A occurs (competitive flight evaluation begins) 
10 Oct – 9 Dec 
1972 The flyoff between the YA-9A and the YA-10A occurs 
17 Jan 1973 The Air Force selects the YA-10A as the winner of the competition 
21 Jun 1973 General Electric is awarded the development contract for the GAU-8/A gun system 
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Jul 1973 The Senate Armed Services Committee cuts A-10 funding and recommends a flyoff between the YA-10A and the A-7D 
25 Mar 1974 Flight testing is completed for the A-10 prototype with the GAU-8/A gun installed 
15 Apr - 9 May 
1974 
The flyoff between the YA-10A and A-7D occurs (the YA-10A is declared 
the winner) 
11 Sep 1974 Testing is completed for the AGM-65A Maverick air-to-ground missile with the A-10 aircraft 
31 Oct 1974 Qualification tests of the TF34-GE-100 engine is completed 
15 Feb 1975 A-10 development test & evaluation testing begins at Edwards AFB 
13 Jun 1975 Initial Operational Test & Evaluation Phase II flight testing is completed 
21 Oct 1975 The first production A-10 flies at the Fairchild Republic plant in Farmingdale, NY 
28 Oct 1975 Testing of the reinforced cracked fuselage frame is completed and the 6,000-hour mark is attained 
13 Nov 1975 The A-10 successfully demonstrates the lethality of the GAU-8/A against tank targets at Nellis AFB 
10 Feb 1976 The Air Force authorizes Fairchild Republic to begin full production of the A-10 at a rate of 15 aircraft per month 
Oct 1977 The first A-10 squadron goes operational 
Mar 1984 A-10 production ends at 713 aircraft (including 6 pre-production) 
Oct 1987 USAF starts converting some A-10s to forward air control aircraft, OA-10s 
1988 USAF considers replacing the A-10 with an F-16 variant, the A-16 
1990 The A-10 is modified to incorporate the Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancements (LASTE) system 
17 Jan – 27 Feb 
1991 Operation Desert Storm (Iraq-Kuwait) 
3 Mar – 6 Jun 
1999 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) 
1999 
The A-10 begins upgrade with the installation of an Embedded Global 
Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (EGI), HOG UP program 
begins with intent of extending structural life to 2028 
7 Oct 2001 War in Afghanistan begins 
18 Feb 2003 Red Team issues report on HOG UP program – major problems noted 
20 Mar 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom begins 
 Jun 2004 HOG UP wing fails fatigue test catastrophically – triggers business case analysis for manufacture of replacement wings 
2005 Upgrading to A-10C begins (improved fire control, electronic countermeasures, precision guided munitions carriage) 
2007 Boeing awarded contract to manufacture replacement wings 
2009 Projected engine upgrade 
2028 A-10’s projected retirement 
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The primary roles of the A-10/OA-10 include close air support, forward air controller, 
combat search and rescue, special operations, and interdiction.  A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt IIs 
have excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, and are highly accurate weapons-
delivery platforms. They can loiter near battle areas for extended periods of time and operate 
under 1,000-foot ceilings (303.3 meters) with 1.5-mile (2.4 kilometers) visibility. Their wide 
combat radius and short takeoff and landing capability permit operations in and out of locations 
near front lines.  A single seat cockpit forward of the wings, and a large bubble canopy provide 
pilots with all-around vision.  Later modifications of the A-10/OA-10 added Night Vision 
Imaging Systems.  The pilots are protected by titanium armor that also protects parts of the 
flight-control system. The redundant primary structural sections allow the aircraft to enjoy better 
survivability during close air support than did previous aircraft.  The aircraft can survive direct 
hits from armor-piercing and high explosive projectiles up to 23mm. Their self-sealing fuel cells 
are protected by internal and external foam. Manual systems back up their redundant hydraulic 
flight-control systems. This permits pilots to fly and land when hydraulic power is lost.  
The Thunderbolt II can be serviced and operated from bases with limited facilities near battle 
areas. Many of the aircraft's parts are interchangeable left and right, including the engines, main 
landing gear and vertical stabilizers.
 
 Table 3 shows some of the characteristics of the A-10. 
Table 3. A-10 Characteristics5
 
 
General Characteristics 
Primary Function A-10 – Close air support OA-10 – Airborne forward air control 
Crew One pilot 
Contractor Fairchild Republic Co. 
Date Deployed March 1976 
Length 53 ft, 4 in 
Height 14 ft, 8 in 
Wingspan 57 ft, 6 in 
 Performance 
Power Plant Two General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbofans 
Thrust 9,065 lbs each engine 
Speed 420 mph (Mach 0.56) 
Ceiling 45,000 ft 
Range 800 mi 
Maximum Takeoff Weight 51,000 lbs 
 Armament 
 One GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun 
 Up to 16,000 lbs of mixed ordnance, AGM-65 Maverick missiles, and laser-guided guided bombs 
 Infrared and electronic countermeasures  
 2.75 in rockets 
 Illumination flares 
 AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles 
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2.2 Operational Deployments 
In March 1976, the 355th Tactical Training Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base was 
the first unit to get the A-10 Thunderbolt II.   Initial overseas deployments included England, 
Japan, and Germany.  The A-10 was deployed in combat for the first time during the Gulf War in 
1991.  It proved to be a very reliable and effective aircraft.  They flew over eight thousand 
sorties, while losing only six planes.  Even though the battle damage assessment was 
conservatively estimated, A-10s were credited with “destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 
501 armored personnel carriers, and 1,106 trucks.  Hogs also destroyed other targets, such as 
Scud missile sites, Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites, and two helicopters.”6  The aircraft has 
participated with outstanding results 
 
in most combat operations since then, including Allied 
Force (Kosovo), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Teeth of the Hog 
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3 The A-10 Story 
3.1 Origins of the Requirements for a Close Air Support Aircraft 
3.1.1 Early Doctrinal Considerations 
The A-10 was somewhat forced on a reluctant Air Force by the needs of the Army.  Prior 
history and experiences in World War II by both the Allied and Axis powers had helped shape 
the doctrine of the Air Force to emphasize strategic bombing and air superiority over CAS.  Even 
in the area of ground attack, Battlefield Air Interdiction was considered much more decisive, and 
therefore more important, than CAS.  The Air Force believed that fighters that were not 
otherwise engaged could take on CAS when needed.  The Air Force emphasized airplanes with 
speed for survivability. The service believed that a pilot trained to perform air-to-air could easily 
perform the air-to-ground mission and thus provided flexibility and a better use of resources.  
Additionally, the Air Force believed that a dedicated attack plane would be limited in capabilities 
and vulnerable.  The Air Force had abandoned its attack designator, “A”, for its aircraft, and the 
clear trend was for larger, faster multi-role fighter aircraft (“F” designated).  The Army, on the 
other hand, needed an aircraft that could carry a great amount of ordnance, loiter in the area for 
some time with excellent maneuverability, and had the ability to take hits from enemy ground 
fire.  There was also a concern over control of assets.   When the Army needed support, its needs 
were immediate.7,8
3.1.2 Lessons from Vietnam 
  By the early 1960s, the Army was evolving around new tactics of air 
mobility, and it wanted close air support that could adapt to these new tactics. 
With regards to CAS and the ability to conduct counterinsurgency, the Air Force was 
largely unprepared for the Vietnam War.  Its main line fighter, the F-105, was big and fast, but 
“the ability to fly closely and slowly enough to see the target, to work safely in poor weather, to 
carry sufficient ordnance, and to remain over the battle area were all limited.”9  The Air Force F-
4Ciii would not arrive in Vietnam until December 1964 and, although it carried a heavier bomb 
load than the F-105, it still did not have the low speed, low altitude and loiter capability needed 
in a CAS aircraft.  The Air Force initially had to rely on ex-trainers and WWII-vintage attack 
planes such as the T-28D and the B-26.  These were short-lived solutions, however, as the slow 
speed and lack of armor on the T-28D made it vulnerable to ground fire, and the aging B-26’s 
were eventually grounded due to structural problems.  A better interim solution became available 
with the use of the semi-obsolete Navy A-1 Skyraider10 (see Figure 6). The A-1 had good low-
speed maneuverability, it could carry upwards of 8,000 lbs of bombs, and it was able to loiter 
around the battlefield and respond quickly to calls for support fires.  “Even many of those who 
favored the supersonic jets conceded that the propeller-driven A-1 was the CAS star.”11
                                                 
iii The F-4C was an adaptation of a Navy aircraft designed as a fleet defense fighter.  While the Air Force may have 
been reluctant to adopt a Navy aircraft, they soon valued it as a fighter bomber and would eventually procure more 
F-4’s than the Navy.  The F-4 saw service with the Air Force from 1964 until 1996, and droned versions of the 
aircraft are still in use today. 
  
Limitations of the A-1 were the limited number of them available from the Navy (production had 
ended in 1957) and its inability to destroy more heavily armored targets.  Losses of the A-1 
continued to escalate in the mid 1960s; particularly due to the radar guided Anti-Aircraft 
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Artillery (AAA) guns being employed by North Vietnam.  The A-37Aiv (Figure 6), an adaptation 
of the T-37v
 
 subsonic trainer, was developed as a counterinsurgency aircraft and deployed to 
Vietnam in 1967, but the A-37A had neither the payload capacity nor the loiter time of the A-1E. 
 
Figure 6. Vietnam era CAS Aircraft: The A-1E Skyraider (L) and A-37A Dragonfly (R) 
 
3.1.3 Army Helicopter Developments and the “Johnson-McConnell Agreement” 
In Vietnam the Army was trying out its new air mobile tactics, and they began employing 
armed helicopters to provide close air support to friendly ground forces.  The Army also wanted 
to expand the use of its Caribou light transport aircraft for resupply in forward areas, but 
attempts to expand their fleet of Caribou and Mohawk fixed wing observation aircraft in FY65 
were rejected by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.  Congress was starting to pay attention 
to the growing debate over CAS, and the Air Force was receiving most of the blame for the 
problems.  Existing doctrine concerning the roles and missions assigned to each service 
permitted the Army to have “armed helicopters, which may direct ‘suppressive fire’ at the 
enemy, but [it], may not have fixed-wing aircraft to provide ‘close air support’ for its ground 
troops.  A helicopter can supplement close air support, but existing limitations preclude it from 
delivering sufficient sustained firepower to provide close air support” 12
 
  The Army’s transition 
into a role normally provided by the Air Force, namely close air support, created tension between 
the services. 
During the early stages of the Vietnam War, the Army began development of an attack 
helicopter for use in providing air cover for ground forces.  The Advanced Aerial Fire Support 
System (AAFSS), or AH-56A Cheyenne, was designed as a large, fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
aircraft with sophisticated avionics and a greatly increased capacity for attacking ground targets 
(see Figure 7).  The AH-56A had a maximum speed of 214 knots and was armed with a 30-mm 
automatic gun in the belly turret and a 40-mm grenade launcher (or 7.62 mm Gatling gun) in the 
chin turret.  It also carried TOW anti-tank missiles and 2.75 in. rocket launchers.13
                                                 
iv An improved variant of the A-37, the A-37B, began production in 1967.  These were primarily intended for the 
South Vietnamese Air Force as replacements for their aging A-1’s. 
  The Air 
v In the 1950s the Air Force had loaned three Cessna T-37As to the Army to conduct tests of CAS in project “Long 
Arm”.  Although the aircraft did not have any armament, they were capable of being fitted with a cannon and racks 
for bombs and rockets.  The trial proved successful and the Army Aviation Board recommended a large 
procurement.  The Air Force moved to stop the idea and the aircraft were returned and no further action was taken.   
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Force perceived the Cheyenne’s primary function as providing fire support, so it believed the 
Cheyenne should compete with other aircraft having a similar function.  The Cheyenne would 
continue to complicate the early formulation and development of the Air Force CAS aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 7. Army’s AH-56 Cheyenne 
 
 By early 1966, the Air Force was facing growing pressure to step up in a big way to 
support CAS.  US Representative Otis Pike chaired a subcommittee that convened for seven days 
in fall of 1965, and the subcommittee released its report in February 1966.14  The report was very 
critical of the Air Force for not having developed, nor pursuing development of, an aircraft 
suitable for the CAS mission.  It was in this political environment that, in early spring of 1966, 
Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson and Air Force Chief of Staff General John 
McConnell “met secretly to resolve air support differences that the Vietnam War had 
aggravated.”15  The Army was committed to helicopter fire support, but Vietnam showed good 
airlift support from Air Force aircraft, and the Army was denied recently by Secretary of Defense 
McNamara when it attempted to expand their support aircraft numbers.  The Air Force wanted 
the Army out of the airborne fire support business, but likely did not have the political support to 
do that given the criticism it was receiving regarding the CAS mission.  The Johnson-McConnell 
agreement shifted the prevailing responsibility criteria of aircraft weight to one of aircraft type.  
Under this agreement, the Air Force retained the CAS mission but recognized the role of Army 
helicopters to provide fire support.  For its part, the Army agreed to give up its large fixed-wing 
transports to the Air Force.  This agreement resolved some issues regarding service 
responsibilities, and it provided the framework by which the two services pursued aircraft system 
development for the ensuing decades.  The agreement did not, however, resolve the roles and 
missions questions surrounding CAS, and Air Force CAS developments continued to compete 
with Army helicopter developments throughout the late 1960s and 1970s.  
 
 
16 
3.2 Concept Formulation 
3.2.1 The Tactical Force Structure 
 In March of 1965, the Air Staff completed a study laying out the desired tactical force 
structure.  It recommended a mix of aircraft to include the F-4vi, F-111vii and other less 
expensive aircraft yet to be named.  In particular, the Air Force recognized the need for a lower 
cost tactical fighter that was optimized for close support, but would possess general capabilities 
in ground attack, special air warfare operations, and would have the capability to survive air-to-
air defenses as well as ground defenses.16  The aircraft being considered for this acquisition were 
the A-7, in current production by the Navy, and the F-5, which was primarily being produced 
under the Military Assistance Program in support of America’s NATOviii and SEATOix
 
 allies 
(see Figure 8).  While neither of these aircraft could be optimized for the close support role, their 
other attributes fit with the desire of the Air Force to pursue multi-role aircraft.  Regardless of 
which aircraft was chosen, the Air Force position was that either represented only an interim 
measure until a more suitable low-cost tactical fighter could be identified or developed. 
 The Air Force’s choice for the interim low-cost tactical fighter was initially an improved 
variant of the F-5 because it had better air-to-air capability than the A-7.  Then Secretary of the 
Air Force Eugene Zuckert communicated that decision to the Secretary of Defense.  In April 
1965 the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) accepted the Air Force 
choice and subsequently authorized the Air Force to pursue development of a follow-on lower 
cost multipurpose fighter, the F-Xx
 
.  Despite their early preference for the F-5, a joint study on 
the cost effectiveness of alternative aircraft conducted in the summer and fall of 1965 by the Air 
Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) resulted in a revised recommendation by 
the Air Force to pursue acquisition of the A-7D, a new variant of the existing Navy A-7 aircraft.  
The A-7D was expected to be low cost (about $1.5M/aircraft) and quickly obtainable, and the 
OSD authorized the Air Force to begin acquisition in December 1965.  The Air Force awarded a 
contract to procure the A-7D in October 1966.  Tactical Air Command subsequently pushed for 
changes to the A-7, and a joint study group between the Navy and the Air Force recommended 
an improved system including new engines and avionics.  This set the A-7D program back by 2-
3 years, and by 1971 the cost had grown to about $3.4M, resulting in greatly reduced numbers of 
A-7D’s produced for the Air Force. 
                                                 
vi The F-4 was being produced as an Air Force variant beginning in 1963.  Although it was evaluated for close air 
support, its primary missions would be interdiction and counter-air operations. 
vii The Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) program began in 1961, and would later be designated the F-111.  It 
was intended to fulfill a Navy fleet defense interceptor requirement as well as an Air Force supersonic strike aircraft 
requirement.  The Air Force F-111A first flew in 1964, but would not enter operational service until 1967.  The 
Navy F-111B was canceled before it entered production. 
viii NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ix SEATO – South-East Asia Treaty Organization 
x The Fighter Experimental (F-X) program evolved into the F-15 program, but the early concept development for the 
A-X program was done by a cadre of engineers within the F-X program office. 
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Figure 8. Early Competitors for the CAS Mission - The F-5 (L) and the A-7D (R) 
3.2.2 Initiation of Concept Formulation 
 The growing use of armed helicopters in Vietnam continued to raise concerns within the 
Air Force.  In June 1966 Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell directed that a study 
be done to determine what aspects of CAS were not being performed to the satisfaction of the 
Army, and what should be done to acquire equipment to meet the deficiencies.  While the study, 
completed in August 1966, concluded that the Army was generally satisfied with Air Force 
supplied CAS, it also revealed that the Army was withholding some categories of CAS for 
fulfillment by Army helicopters.  Further, it found that the Air Force aircraft lacked the 
capabilities to perform the helicopter escort and suppressive fire roles.17
 
  The Army was bridging 
these gaps by arming helicopters, and increasing expenditures for the UH-1H Cobra helicopter 
gunship and the development effort on the Army Advanced Aerial Fire Support System 
(AAFSS) caused further concern to the Air Force.   
 The CAS study provided two important recommendations for the Air Force: “(1) the Air 
Force should take steps to highlight in official USAF doctrine, tactics and procedures 
publications the methods for accomplishing those missions for which the armed helicopters were 
provided and which the Air Force considered part of the close air support function; and (2) to 
fulfill the requirements for the 1970 plus time period, the Air Force should take immediate and 
positive steps to obtain a specialized close air support aircraft, simpler and cheaper than the A-7, 
and with equal or better characteristics than the A-1.”18  On 8 September 1966, General 
McConnell directed that the Air Force take immediate action to design, develop, and obtain a 
specialized close air support aircraft, and on 22 December 1966, Headquarters USAF issued a 
Requirements Action Directive (RAD) for a specialized aircraft designated the A-X19
3.2.3 Early Concept Studies 
. 
 The RAD for the A-X directed Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) to prepare a 
Concept Formulation Package (CFP) and a preliminary Technical Development Plan (TDP).  It 
cited an urgent need (IOCxi
                                                 
xi Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the A-X was interpreted as the delivery of the first 18 aircraft to 
operational inventory. 
 of 1970) which dictated maximum employment of existing state-of-
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the-art technology in its design, thus allowing for a compressed conceptual design phase.  The A-
X would be designed to provide close air support of ground units, escort of helicopters and low 
performance aircraft, protection of landing surface forces and vehicle convoys, and armed 
reconnaissance.   
 
 The A-X was to be a single-man, lightweight aircraft with sufficient range and capacity 
to carry a maximum payload at low altitude from a Main Operating Base (MOB) to a forward 
area with a significant loiter time on station.  Maneuverability requirements stressed agility in 
attack and reattack maneuvering at low speed, and the A-X required stability throughout a 
weapon release speed range of 200-400 knotsxii
 
.  Key requirements are shown in Table 4 below. 
Table 4. A-X Requirements from Dec 1966 Requirements Action Directive 
Performance Parameter Desired Required
Gross Weight (lbs) 22,500 30,000
Payload - Mixed Ordnance (lbs) 8,000 6,000
Combat Radius (nautical miles) --- 200
Loiter Time @ Combat Radius (hrs) --- 2
Min Maneuvering Speed @ 5000 ft (knots) 120 150
Turn Radius @ Combat Weight (ft) 1,000 2,000
Max Speed @ Sea Level w/ Ext. Ordnance (knots) 550 450  
 
The A-X RAD called for fixed, internally mounted guns with a “capability equal to or 
better than four M-39 20mm guns”20.  It also added consideration for a large caliber 
semiautomatic recoilless rifle.  A minimum of six ordnance stations were required capable of 
delivering all types of conventional ordnance projected for use through 1970-1985.  Although the 
intended operating scenarios stressed a permissive environment, the CFP was to consider the 
feasibility of incorporating a limited air-to-air missile capability as a defensive measure.  
Survivability from ground fire was an essential characteristic for the A-X.  Structural and system 
design would need to provide inherent survivability, to include self sealing fuel tanks and, if 
power flight controls were used, a manual backup system would be provided.  The pilot and 
critical flight systems would be protected from 14.5mm projectiles (common Soviet Anti-
Aircraft shells).  The aircraft was to “incorporate maintainability characteristics which will make 
it possible for this system to meet its combat operational objectives with a minimum of 
maintenance effort and expenditure.”21
 
 
The A-X was to use an existing state-of-the-art engine in order to achieve an early Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC).  The number and type of engines was not specified by the RAD; 
they would be determined by trade-space analysis considering performance, cost, survivability 
and maintainability.  The A-X would also use existing state-of-the-art equipment for avionics 
(communications, navigation, and weapons delivery systems).  Communication equipment was 
to be compatible with Forward Air Control (FAC) equipment and Army airborne vehicles.  
Navigation equipment was to be capable of night and adverse weather navigation from the MOB 
                                                 
xii knots – Nautical Miles (NM) per hour 
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to the target, and would also allow maximum range ferry flight and Continental US (CONUS) 
operation using conventional radio-navigation facilities.  The weapon delivery system required a 
depressable-reticle fixed optical sight.  A slant-ranging device with an automatic release system 
was desirable if it could be obtained within the cost, availability, reliability and accuracy 
constraints.  Based on Air Force and contractor studies, the estimated unit flyaway cost for the 
A-X was $1 - $1.2M (FY70$) depending on purchase quantities.  Research and Development 
costs were estimated at $240M. 
 
The F-X System Program Office (SPO) within the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) 
of AFSC was assigned supervision of the A-X concept formulation and program planning.  
Beginning in January 1967, ASD began preparation of government configuration studies, and a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) to industry for system studies.  The RFP was released in March 
1967, and on 1 May 1967 four contracts were awarded to McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, 
Grumman, and General Dynamics.  The contractor studies were to be complete by 1 September 
1967, and were to include point designs, supporting data, and detailed development plans.  The 
contractor studies were to be used, along with the ASD configuration studies, for the Concept 
Formulation Package. 
 
On 19 April 1967, the F-X SPO forwarded a preliminary proposal22 to AFSC 
headquarters.  The AFRDQ A-X Proposal contained the Air Force (ASD) configuration studies 
for two candidate vehicles.  The first vehicle configuration used a single turbo-prop engine, 
while the second vehicle configuration used two wing-mounted turbofan engines.  Neither of 
these configurations was considered optimal, but they were considered representative of aircraft 
available in the 1970 time period.  Each design was “a single place vehicle incorporating the 
baseline avionics complement and a single 30mm modified M-61 gun with 1000 rounds of 
ammunition.”23
 
  The proposal contained not only the configuration data, but probability of 
survivable and vulnerable areas, performance assessments, and cost and schedule estimates.  
Data on optimum weapons and delivery conditions for the A-X was provided by the Air Force 
Armament Laboratory.  The design mission for the proposal consisted of: 5 minute warm-up and 
take-off; climb to 5000 ft at optimum power setting; cruise to 200 NM at 250 knots; loiter for 2 
hours at 5000 ft; descent to sea level for 15 minutes of combat at 250-300 knots; climb to 5000 ft 
at optimum power setting; cruise back to base at 5000 ft, 250 knots; descent and landing with 
reserve fuel for 20 minutes loiter at sea level. Weapon loading for the design mission included 
seven MK117 general purpose bombs at 830 lbs each, and 1000 rounds of ammunition.   
The vehicle design analysis investigated the parameters of wing loading (W/S) and aspect 
ratio and their relation to the major design requirements.  The gross weights to accomplish the 
design mission were calculated for fixed values of aspect ratio and wing loading.  The results 
indicated that “for a given wing loading, lower aspect ratios, in spite of greater induced drag 
during the mission, result in smaller vehicles.  This is directly the result of lower wing weights 
based on the design factor.”24
 
  Other performance requirements considered included low speed 
maneuverability, cruise speed, take-off distance, and ferry range with and without external fuel 
tanks.  The analysis led to a selected design point which could meet or exceed all requirements.   
The turboprop design was based on the GE T64-16 turboshaft engine.  The engine was 
being developed for the Army’s AAFSS Cheyenne helicopter, and full qualification tests for the 
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engine were scheduled for March 1968.  This engine was capable of approximately 10,000 lbs 
thrust at sea level, and resulted in an aircraft gross weight of 27,700 lbs.  For the turboprop 
design, the minimum gross weight (27,700 lbs) for the aircraft was determined by the sustained 
1.5 g turn requirement and “for an arbitrary upper aspect ratio of 7”25.  A design point with an 
aspect ratio of 7 and wing loading of 60 met or exceeded all requirements for the turboprop 
design.  The turbofan design was based on the GE CF700-2c engine because “it was the only 
turbofan type available in the thrust class of interest for a twin engine configuration.”26
 
  The sea 
level maximum thrust for this engine was 3,880 lbs resulting in an aircraft gross weight of 
28,800 lbs.  Only limited data was provided for the turbofan design due to the poor performance 
predicted for that configuration.  Specifically, poor fuel flow characteristics and inadequate 
thrust available from the turbofan engines resulted in aircraft performance not meeting 
requirements for loiter time, take-off distance, and low speed maneuverability.   
 The contributions from the Air Force Armament Laboratory included two options for an 
internal gun on the A-X.  Option I was a modification of the proven M-61 20 mm gun rebarreled 
to fire the Army WECOM 30 mm round.  It had a lower muzzle velocity (2200 ft/sec), but 
accommodated a larger round with lower recoil.  A six barrel configuration provided a rate-of-
fire up to 6000 rounds/minute.  Importantly, the modified M-61 gun was considered achievable 
within the schedule of the A-X.  Option II consisted of a 25 mm gun with higher muzzle velocity 
(4000 ft/sec) providing longer stand-off and a secondary air-to-air capability.  However, it had a 
higher recoil and the delivery date for a fully qualified gun system was estimated to be 1972 
(outside the schedule of the A-X, which had a target IOC of 1970).  On 5 January 1968 the Air 
Staff issued a Requirements Action Directive for Air-to-Ground Gun Systems for Close Support 
Aircraft27.  This RAD instructed AFSC to plan the development and acquisition of an air-to-
ground gun system including associated rounds as an integral component of the A-X.  The 
directive specified three target types for the new gun: troops in foliage in foxholes; tanks and 
armored personnel carriers; and hard targets such as bunkers and revetted guns.  The RAD 
specified required probability of kill (Pk) for each of these target types.  At the time the services 
had in development or production several air-to-ground missile systems with good effectiveness 
against these same target types, but each system had limitations in application.28
 
  The guidance 
systems of these missiles required good visibility and greater distance, and the wider collateral 
damage limited their use in situations when friendly troops were engaging the enemy at close 
range. 
 The avionics for the A-X were specified in terms of a “skeleton” package (below 
minimum requirements), a “lean” package (met only minimum requirements) and three add-on 
packages that would supplement the “lean” package.29  Table 5, reproduced from an AFSC 
Historical Publication, lists the A-X avionics equipment packages as well as their projected 
weights and costs.  The “skeleton” avionics package included only communication and Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR) navigation aids.  The “lean” package added Doppler Navigation for night 
and adverse weather, and a radar ranger and gun camera for improved weapons accuracy and 
post-attack effectiveness evaluation.  The “lean” package met requirements for three of the four 
indicated missions, but was considered inadequate for armed reconnaissance in the immediate 
battlefield area.  The first add-on option improved capabilities for finding targets and terrain 
avoidance – considered important when hunting for targets.  The second add-on improved 
capabilities for locating vehicles by adding moving target indication (MTI) to the radar and 
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inertial supplements to the Doppler navigation system to improve the over-all accuracy.  The 
third add-on package provided increased strike capability with the addition of the Maverick 
missile.xiii  According to the A-X Proposal, “the prime mission of the A-X and the Maverick are 
the same – air-to-surface close support, the Maverick should be one of the prime weapons of the 
A-X.”30
 
  Incorporation of the Maverick missile required a cockpit television display for aligning 
the missile’s seeker on the target.  All equipment was considered to be existing state-of-the-art 
technology achievable within the development timelines for the A-X. 
Table 5. A-X Avionics Packages31 
 
 
 The required IOC of December 1970 was considered high risk with respect to cost and 
schedule, but achievable if the concept definition phase was reduced to a four month contract 
definition phase followed by a competitive source selection of design proposals, with subsequent 
award of a single development contract that would include go-ahead for production of the total 
system.  The compressed schedule would not allow any prototype evaluation phase that was 
favored by some leaders in the Air Force.32  The proposed program would require concurrent 
development among wind tunnel test, engineering design, design and fabrication of tooling, and 
manufacture of the aircraft.  It also required a shortened flight test program, with overlapping 
Category I, II and III testing.xiv
                                                 
xiii The AGM-65 “Maverick” missile was in early development at the time of A-X Concept Formulation.  The rocket 
propelled, TV-guided AGM-65A reached IOC in 1972, and later variants of the missile are still in use by the Air 
Force as of the publication date of this case study.  The principal targets for the AGM-65 are relatively small, hard 
targets (e.g., main battle tanks). 
  Given the potential for cost and schedule problems associated 
with this approach, “a more realistic schedule would be one in which the IOC date is delayed at 
xiv Category I, II and III flight testing referred to developmental test, initial operational test, and operational testing, 
respectively.  Air Force regulations at the time specified that Category I and II testing would be complete prior to 
Category III flight tests. 
 
 
22 
least 12 months.”33
3.2.4 The Concept Formulation Package 
  Assuming a largely successful program, the projected unit cost (FY70$) for 
the turboprop version was $0.837M (600 aircraft buy) - $0.937M (400 aircraft buy).  The 
projected unit cost for the turbofan version was $0.989M (600 aircraft buy) - $1.092M (400 
aircraft buy).   
 Using the government AFRDQ A-X Proposal and the four contractor studies, the A-X 
working group prepared a Concept Formulation Package (CFP).  The purpose of the package 
was “to justify conditional approval for Contract Definition and Engineering/Operational 
Systems Development for a new specialized Close Air Support Aircraft (A-X).”34
 
  The initial 
CFP, delivered on 1 March 1968, was revised by the Air Staff in May 1968.  The revised plan 
provided a six month slip in the IOC date. 
 The CFP defined the close air support mission as having three tasks: Close Support Fire 
(CSF), Armed Escort (AE), and Armed Reconnaissance (AR).  The first two were considered 
complementary and the most important of the three tasks.  AR involved different weapons and 
target acquisition systems, and other systems with AR capabilities such as the AC-130xv
 
 gunship  
were already under development.  Further, the A-X designed for CSF/AE would have inherent 
capabilities for day and night visual AR.  Studies of weather in South-East Asia, Europe, and 
Korea showed only 5-14% weather restricted hours for a maneuverable CAS aircraft capable of 
operating with a 1000 ft cloud ceiling and visibility of 1 mile (the minimums required).  Future 
avionics developments were expected to improve significantly the night and non-visual weapons 
delivery, and a specialized AR version of the A-X was considered an attractive growth option. 
 The CFP identified four key characteristics for the CAS mission: responsiveness, 
lethality, survivability, and simplicity.  Counter to some proponents within the Air Force, 
responsiveness was not determined by speed, but from the ability to operate from forward area 
basing and extensive loiter time in the battlefield area.  Responsiveness also dictated that it be 
able to interface with Air Force and Army Command, Control and Communication (C3) 
equipment.  Lethality would be determined by a varied payload of bombs, rockets, guided 
missiles and a “new large-caliber high velocity, high-rate-of-fire gun.”35
Survivability would depend on maneuverability, redundancy and shielding of critical subsystems 
(and the pilot), small aircraft size, shielding of IR
  Survivability would 
require protection from small arms, 7.62 mm and 14.5 mm machine guns, anti-aircraft artillery 
(principally the Soviet ZSU-23 mm system), REDEYE and other Surface-to-Air (SAM) missiles.   
xvi
 
 sources, and weapon delivery systems that 
would reduce the amount of time the aircraft was vulnerable and allow for greater flexibility in 
approach and delivery of weapons.  Finally, it was intended that simplicity of design would lead 
to a shorter development time, lower life cycle cost, reduced maintenance times, increased sortie 
rates, and the ability to operate from austere bases.     
                                                 
xv In 1967, the Air Force modified a C-130A transport aircraft into an AC-130A “Spectre” gunship.  The AC-130A 
utilized side mounted Gatling guns and an analog fire control computer to provide close support fires.  Successful 
tests of the prototype led to an immediate deployment to South Vietnam in Sept 1967, and subsequent production of 
additional aircraft.  While the AC-47 gunship preceded the AC-130 by about two years, it was not widely used for 
armed reconnaissance.  The AC-47 was also considered to be underpowered and vulnerable to ground fire. 
xvi Infrared (IR) sources, particularly the engine exhaust, made the aircraft vulnerable to detection by air defense 
systems, and were targetable by increasingly proliferated IR guided SAM’s. 
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 Extensive analysis was done on how the CAS mission would originate and be conducted.  
Figure 9 shows the Army/Air Force communication and the required interfaces for the pre-
planned CAS mission requests.  It assumed target acquisition would be made by Army units and 
coordinated through the Army/Air Force net.  To support immediate requests, the Direct Air 
Support Center would request a number of alert aircraft for the following day from the Tactical 
Air Control Center.  “Forward basing and co-location of CAS aircraft with Army units allows 
shortening of the request process and substantial reduction of response time.”36
 
  Further, it was 
intended that the forward based aircraft would be in direct communication with the Forward Air 
Controller (FAC) and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) attached to the ground forces, thus 
allowing employment in the same manner as alert aircraft.  Figure 10 depicts the CAS mission 
sequence for both pre-planned and immediate request missions.  For the CSF and AE tasks, the 
target area or route and general target type is known.  For the AR task, the reconnaissance area is 
known but the type and number of targets is unknown.  A description of how the A-X would 
interface with the Tactical Air Control System appears as Appendix C. 
 
Figure 9.  Coordination for Pre-Planned CAS Requests37
 
 
 The CFP contained extensive trade studies to translate the four key characteristics into 
aircraft performance requirements.  Some of these trade studies are shown in Appendix D.  
Responsiveness was translated into requirements for combat radius, minimum take-off distance 
(driven by the need to operate out of forward bases with short runways), cruise speed and loiter 
time.  Loiter time and sortie rate were used to determine the size of the force required (including 
amount of ordnance) to maintain continuous alert over the battle area.  Maintenance man-hours 
per flying hours (MMH/FH) emerged as a key metric and direct indicator of aircraft complexity 
and was plotted against peak and sustained sortie rates for a range of aircraft operating in South-
East Asia (see Figure 11).  Of note, there was an observed ratio of more than 3:1 in MMH/FH 
between the most complex and the simplest strike aircraft, with the F-4 and F-105 aircraft having 
actual MMH/FH values of 33.2 and 27.6, respectively, and A-1 and A-37 having values of 14.3 
and 7.8, respectively.38  Sustained sortie rate was determined to be relatively insensitive to 
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aircraft complexity, most likely due to lower than maximum sortie rates.  Together with the 
higher allowable peak sortie rates, the most valuable aspect of simplicity was shown to be the 
ability to operate from austere forward bases, with the attendant improvement in response time.   
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Close Air Support Mission Sequence39
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Figure 11. Sortie Rates for Aircraft in SEA40
 
 
 Historical analysis of ground fire attrition in World War II, Korea and Vietnam was used 
to determine which aircraft equipment was most vulnerable and/or likely to lead to loss of an 
aircraft due to ground fire.  The known causes included engine, controls, structure, pilot and fire.  
The CFP identified design emphasis that could reduce the loss rates.  These design features 
were:41
 
  
1. Fuel can be protected from fire and kept from ignition sources. 
2. Manual controls can be made practically invulnerable. 
3. Crew compartments can be sufficiently shielded and armored to make pilot losses 
insignificant. 
4. Engines can be shielded, fire protected, and made almost fully redundant.  Their oil 
supplies can be protected. 
 
Maneuverability was also identified as a component of survivability, and the effects of speed and 
maneuverability were analyzed against probability of aircraft loss for a range of delivery profiles 
and threat systems.  The performance requirements most important for short range attack were 
low cruise speed with combat loads, and both high instantaneous and sustained g-limits for 
initiation and execution of short radius turns without losing altitude.  Superior low speed 
maneuvering and dive capabilities were shown to enhance close-in fast re-attack tactics, allowing 
operation in visibility half or less than that required for high speed jet aircraft.  The importance 
of this on the A-X availability due to weather conditions can be seen in Table 6.  High speed jet 
aircraft required minimums of 2000 ft cloud ceiling and 3 mile visibility for safe operations, 
while the A-X was expected to operate with minimums of 1000 ft/1 mile.   
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Table 6. Availability of Weather Suitable for CAS Operations42 
 
  
Lethality studies, in addition to addressing weapon types and load-outs, analyzed the 
accuracy of tracking and delivery as it related to speed, dive angles, and airframe stability.  The 
A-X needed to be capable of stable deliveries in the region of 200-300 knots and at dive angles 
up to 50-70 degrees.  This would allow first past delivery with CEP xvii
 
 of 100 feet, and a CEP of 
50 feet under multiple pass conditions.  Simulations with pilots using a ground simulator 
demonstrated the relation between delivery accuracy and common stability derivatives used in 
aircraft control system design.   
 Each of four contractors awarded study contracts in May 1967 submitted design 
approaches in support of the Concept Formulation Package.  These design studies considered a 
range of design choices in: 1) Airframe and Propulsion; 2) Avionics; 3) Armament; and 4) 
Survivability Provisions.  The performance regime specified for the A-X posed no stringent 
requirements on the airframe, and conventional aluminum airframes were recommended by all 
contractors.  There was more variation in propulsion options, but all contractors recommended 
either turboprop or turbofan engines, either in single or twin engine configurations.  Engine 
availability investigations by the Air Force determined there were no suitable turbofan engines 
that could meet the required IOC, and even excursion investigations that removed the IOC 
constraint favored the use of turboprops.  The reason for this conclusion was that the available 
thrust from the turboprop exceeded that of the turbofan at all speeds up to approximately 400 
knots.  The primary operating regime of the A-X existed below this value.  The configurations 
recommended by the A-X study contractors appear in Appendix E.  Vertical and Short Take-off 
and Landing (V/STOL) configuration concepts were considered by several of the study 
contractors, but were not considered an appropriate choice for the A-X due to inferior 
performance, high cost, and development risk, especially with the current IOC objective.43
 
 
 The A-X study contractors were required to provide parametric design analyses based on 
a standard set of instructions.  The parametric studies were then used to define measures of merit 
for evaluation of the various airframe/propulsion combinations.  These measures of merit were 
divided into two categories: maneuverability characteristics, and payload/loiter/radius 
capabilities when operated from runways of varying length.  For maneuverability, the best 
available measure was determined to be Specific Excess Power (SEP), a quantitative measure of 
the ability of an aircraft to climb and/or accelerate when flying at a specific airspeed, altitude and 
                                                 
xvii Circular Error Probable (CEP) is a common weaponeering term which refers to the radius within which 50% or 
more of the rounds would fall for a given delivery profile. 
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load factor.  These parametric studies were to be used in Contract Definition to determine the 
levels of performance desired and technically feasible for the A-X.  It was shown that the 
maneuverability specifications were far more critical than those dealing with 
radius/payload/loiter characteristics.  The studies were inconclusive regarding power loading and 
the proper airframe-engine match.  A remaining task was to establish a proper set of SEP goals to 
strike a balance between high and low-speed performance, and between turning and level 
acceleration. 
 
 An entire section of the CFP was devoted to a comparison of the A-X to existing 
candidate aircraft in terms of mission performance parameters and cost effectiveness.  Table 7 
shows some of these comparisons.  Of note, the A-X external load capacity had doubled from the 
required amount at the start of concept formulation without a significant growth in the empty 
weight of the aircraft.  The trade studies had shown that the twin turboprop designs combined 
with increased wing area produced substantial benefits, and consideration of “growth” engines in 
development improved the designs further (with some attendant increase in unit flyaway cost).  
The CFP comparisons clearly showed the benefit of a specialized design for a CAS aircraft, and 
none of the candidate aircraft could match the predicted A-X performance.  Other comparisons 
showed significant improvements for the A-X in terms of target kills/sortie as it equaled or 
typically beat all other candidates for all missions considered.   In a force cost analysis, the A-X 
had the lowest total force cost due to the small force required, which could be traced to high 
availability over the battlefield, high sortie rates, and high sortie effectiveness. 
  
Coincident with the CFP development, Air Force Systems Command had established a 
Close Air Support Gun System Study Group staffed from the Armament Laboratory and the Cost 
Analysis Division of the Armament Development and Test Center at Eglin AFB, FL.  All the A-
X study contractors had recommended a large caliber internal gun, and the 30 mm projectile 
showed significant advantages over smaller caliber rounds.  The study group awarded four gun 
system study contracts in early 1968 to Philco-Ford, GE, TRW, and Harvey Engineering 
Laboratories.  All but Harvey recommended a 30 mm variant, and Harvey’s recommendation of 
a 57 mm recoilless rifle was rejected by the Gun System Study Group because of its low rate of 
fire and attendant low kill probability.  The study group favored using depleted uranium rounds 
because the higher density shells offered greater penetration and had inherent pyrophoric 
characteristics, which increased the probability of secondary ignition inside tank turrets.  The 
Gun System Study Group published its final report in September 1969, recommending a 30 mm 
internally-mounted Gatling gun system together with a family of associated rounds developed 
especially for close air support.44
 
  The Munitions Division of AFSC recommended a 
prime/subcontractor approach to the development of the gun ammunition to assure system 
integration with minimum problems.   
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Table 7. Candidate CAS Aircraft Characteristics45 
 
3.2.5 Contract Definition 
 Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Harold Brown submitted the CFP to the Secretary of 
Defense on 17 Jun 1968, requesting permission and funding to enter into Contract Definition.  
From the late FY71 date in the CFP, the IOC date was slipped into FY72 in an August 1968 Air 
Force Program Change Request.  The office of the DDR&E prepared a Development Concept 
Paper (DCP) which was submitted to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 1968.  Four 
management sub-issues were spelled out in the DCP:46
 
 
1. Would an appropriately modified, existing aircraft meet the requirement? 
2. Should the initial development be a single-place A-X with minimum avionics for visual 
attack only, or should concurrent development proceed with a two-place version 
equipped with avionics for night/adverse-weather close support? 
3. Should competitive prototypes by developed and flown before selecting the basic A-X 
configuration? 
4. Should the A-X be bought instead of some of the already programmed A-7s or F-111s, 
or, as the Air Force proposed, as an addition to the tactical Air Force structure? 
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Entry into Concept Definition was not approved as the Air Force initially requested.  Dr. 
John Foster, DDR&E, recommended that the concept formulation studies be continued, but the 
initial advanced development of the CAS gun system should begin in FY69.  He questioned the 
survivability of the A-X against heavier defenses (the CFP emphasized survivability against 
small arms defenses) and wanted to wait for additional data and test results on the A-37, OV-10, 
and A-7.  Dr. Foster stated that “the proposed aircraft seems to be too large, and has too much 
range/payload at this early stage.  It is so similar to A-7 that it is hard to justify when we already 
have A-7.  A smaller, less costly, quick reaction aircraft seems more appropriate.”47  After 
reviewing the DCP, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved $12M in the FY70 budget for 
Contract Definition, contingent on the Air Force’s completion of supplemental studies 
addressing the size and weight of the A-X, survivability of the A-X in the anticipated threat 
environment, and methods to improve the aircraft night and adverse weather capability.48
 
   
The Air Force reestablished the A-X Working Group with the intention of completing the 
CFP supplements by May 1969.  Air Force Systems Command was also to provide a Technical 
Development Plan (TDP) to accompany the CFP supplements and address additional issues 
necessary for approval of Contract Definition.  On 22 September 1969, the Air Force forwarded 
the three supplements to the CFP to the OSD.  The DDR&E prepared a draft revised 
Development Concept Paper, DCP-23A, completed in December 1969.  The Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) met on 19 December 1969 and raised questions with 
regards to discrepancies between the Air Force and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Studies and Analysis (OASD (SA)) cost estimates.  Army representatives raised 
concerns regarding the affordability of another major tactical aircraft program, and the 
sufficiency of the A-X to meet needs for night and all-weather operations.  Dr. Foster issued 
tasks to resolve the remaining questions, and the results of the tasks would be used to update the 
DCP-23A.   
 
The final version of DCP-23A, dated 16 March 1970, contained three management sub-
issues, but they were essentially the same as those from the original DCP-23, differing only in 
wording and number.  The issue of tactical force mix had become even more troubling to OSD 
since, in FY70, the A-7, F-4, and F-111 were all in production, and the F-111 was consuming 
close to half of the Air Force’s tactical fighter aircraft funding.  Further, the Air Force had just 
awarded a development contract to McDonnell Douglas for the F-15.  The A-X fared well in a 
force mix analysis for conflicts where air superiority was not necessary, but for a high intensity 
conventional war (e.g., the envisioned war in Europe) the demand for air superiority/interdiction 
was considered critical, making it difficult to justify reducing the numbers of multi-role aircraft 
in favor of A-X acquisition.   
 
One result of the delay from DCP-23 to DCP-23A was the emergence of support for 
competitive prototyping as opposed to the more conventional Contract Definition approach.  
Robert McNamara, who was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to early 1968, was opposed to 
competitive prototyping so it had fallen out of favor during his tenure.  After McNamara’s 
resignation proponents of the approach became more vocal and gained support.  General James 
Ferguson, AFSC Commander, favored competitive prototyping, and while Dr. Foster maintained 
the necessity of paper analysis, he conceded the utility of competitive prototyping for reducing 
technical risk.49  The new Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, established panels to 
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look at cost growth in systems acquisition and concluded that the Defense Department would 
benefit by a “judicious increase” in hardware demonstration and competition, with a subsequent 
reduction in dependence on paper analysis.  With these changes afoot, The Air Force developed 
four new program schedules with associated costs as part of the TDP being prepared.  Three of 
the four schedules were associated with a prototyping approach.  In October 1969, Secretary of 
the Air Force Harold Seamans chose an alternative that was termed “Parallel Undocumented 
Development”.  This approach would require a minimal amount of documentation during the 
competitive prototype phase to encourage innovation and initiative on the part of the 
contractors.50
 
  While it was expected that the competitive prototyping phase would reduce 
technical risk and lead to a better source selection decision, it increased the expected RDT&E 
costs from $155.1M to $194.0M. 
Three alternative recommendations were put forward in DCP-23A:  
 
Alternative IA: Approve development of the A-X aircraft via a normal Contract 
Definition backed by an appropriate parallel program in avionics and ordnance. 
Alternative IB: Approve development of the A-X via a competitive prototype flyoff 
backed by an appropriate parallel program in avionics and ordnance. 
Alternative II
 
: Disapprove development of a new A-X aircraft at this time but continue to 
upgrade sensors and ordnance for use in conjunction with existing aircraft. 
The parallel program specification in alternatives IA and IB reflected the Army’s continued 
concern over the night and adverse weather capability of the A-X.  On 6 April 1970 Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Packard approved Alternative IB.xviii  A proviso associated with Packard’s 
decision stated that there would be “future discussions with AF & Army on cooperation in this 
program and coordination with the AAFSS program.”51  It was clear that there was significant 
overlap in the projected capabilities of the A-X and the AH-56 helicopter, and the Air Force and 
the Army had not been able to agree as to how they would both fit in or be necessary given the 
roles and missions for CAS.  The two services had jointly recommended funding both systems 
through prototype development, but it was becoming clear that tougher choices were going to be 
necessary.xix
 
  Further complicating the situation, the Marine Corps wanted its own CAS aircraft, 
the Vertical and Short Take-off and Landing (V/STOL) AV-8 Harrier. 
Table 8 shows cost, schedule and aircraft characteristics comparisons associated with 
DCP-23 and DCP-23A.  The representative A-X from the DCP-23A was slightly smaller, lighter 
and cheaper than that of DCP-23.  The delay associated with DCP-23A and the change to a 
competitive prototyping approach had a significant effect on IOC, with the new projected IOC 
now in FY75.   
                                                 
xviii Of note, the sole dissenting recommendation on DCP-23A was the Secretary of the Navy who recommended 
Alternative II.  Stated reasons were lack of night and all-weather capability, and no Navy/Marine Corp requirement 
for a single mission aircraft.  Survivability and cost realism were also considered questionable. 
xix Interestingly, the Army had awarded a production contract for 375 AH-56 helicopters in 1968; however, the 
production was canceled the following years for default by the contractor.  The Army concluded that aircraft 
delivered on the contracted schedule would not meet speed and maneuverability specifications.  Nonetheless, the 
Army continued the development effort on the AH-56 for several more years. 
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Table 8. Changes in the Representative A-X Associated with DCP-23A52 
 
 
A positive effect of the delay had to do with the technology maturation associated with the 
engines.  In the mid 1960s, both GE and Lycoming had been experimenting with high bypass 
ratio turbofans, and a big boost for the technology came in 1965 when the Air Force selected the 
TF39 engine to power the C-5 Galaxy heavy lift aircraft.  Still, there was no proven turbofan 
engines in the size and thrust class required for the A-X during this time, so turboprops 
continued to be favored.  In 1966, the Navy selected a new turbofan engine design, the GE TF34, 
as part of the development effort for the S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft.  This provided 
development funding for GE to mature the design and build and test the new engine.  By 1970 
the development effort was bearing fruit, and it became clear that the potential for a twin 
turbofan design for the A-X existed.    This resulted in direction to industry to consider turbofan 
configurations.  The expected benefits of the high bypass turbofan for the CAS role were as 
follows:53
• Simplicity of design. No propeller and no reduction gear, or, at least, a much 
smaller or simpler system; 
 
• Ease of maintenance, vital in the battlefield and for optimum sortie rates; 
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• Ease of installation, being modular in design, and ease of access; 
• The high-bypass turbo was relatively quiet compared with the propeller or 
conventional jet engine; 
• Affordability: cheap to purchase, cheap to run, cheap to replace; 
• Reduced IR signature; 
• High thrust at low speed, enhancing maneuverability. 
3.3   Program Formulation 
3.3.1 Request for Proposals 
 The Air Force received the System Management Directive authorizing the A-X program 
on 10 April 1970.  The Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) of Air Force Systems Command 
(AFSC) officially established an A-X SPO on 27 April 1970 within the Deputy for Systems 
Management.xx  In keeping with the philosophy of minimum documentation for the Parallel 
Undocumented Development phase, the SPO was to be manned on an austere basis.54
 
  The 
Parallel Undocumented Development phase permitted a large degree of contractor freedom, and 
many management and technical reporting requirements were deleted.  The desired outcome was 
greater initiative, inventiveness, and competition among the contractors, and the Air Force would 
be able to defer the costly commitment to production until more complete design and cost data 
became available from the prototyping phase.   
 The A-X Request for Proposal (RFP), including all attachments and “boiler plate”, was 
104 pages, and it limited each contractor’s response to 585 pages.  This represented a sizable 
reduction in the RFP for its time, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard considered it a 
“major breakthrough” made possible through the use of competitive prototyping, and indicated it 
was the direction he wanted the Defense Department to go.55
 
  Two crucial goals in the RFP were 
achievement of weapon system effectiveness, and low costs.  The RFP established a design-to-
cost goal of $1.4M unit flyaway cost (FY70$) for a 600 aircraft buy.  The system requirements in 
the RFP were for the production aircraft, and were to be achieved in the prototype aircraft on a 
“best effort” basis by the contractors.  The Competitive Prototype Phase (CPP) was to be a 26 
month effort during which two contractors would design, develop and fabricate two prototype 
aircraft for flight test and Air Force evaluation.  The contract type for the CPP would be firm 
fixed price.  Contractors would have 3 months to respond to the RFP, and the government 
intended to complete its evaluation of proposals and make awards within a 75 day period.   
 Twelve companies were selected to receive the RFP upon its release on 8 May 1970, and 
on 7 August 1970 six companies responded with proposals.  The responders were Fairchild 
Hiller, Boeing, Northrop, Cessna, General Dynamics and Lockheed Aircraft.  Table 9 shows the 
proposal summary from the resulting source selection briefing to the DSARC, and Appendix F 
provides aircraft configurations and performance summaries for the contractor proposals.  Of 
note, almost all proposals represented larger aircraft than spelled out in the CFP, and four of the 
six proposals intended to use the GE TF-34 turbofan engine, with a fifth proposal specifying it as 
a backup.  By 1970, the TF-34 was promising approximately 9,000 lbs of thrust, more than twice 
                                                 
xx Initially an A-X SPO had been established under the Deputy for Development Planning in May of 1968 when the 
Air Force anticipated approval of the original CFP.  Manning for the SPO reached a high of 22, but was gradually 
reduced to only 3 people by May 1969 due to delays in program approval by OSD. 
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the thrust of the GE CF700 turbofan engine that was investigated during the early concept 
studies.  Only Boeing proposed a turboprop design, and the evaluation noted “potentially 
significant development problems with the gearbox and cross-shafting.” 56    The Lockheed and 
Cessna proposals were eliminated relatively early on; the Lockheed design was considered too 
big and expensive, and the Cessna design was considered “preliminary and incompletely 
designed”. The Source Selection Evaluation Board, chaired by Colonel James Hildebrandt (A-X 
Program Director), completed their evaluation and by late October 1970 Secretary Seamans was 
briefed on the results.  The DSARC was briefed in December 1970 and expressed concern that 
both winning proposals exceeded the DCP-23A cost baselines for RDT&E and production.  In 
order to reduce these costs the Air Force was to provide guidance stressing simplicity of design, 
ease of maintenance, and the importance of keeping costs of the A-X to a minimum.  The 
contractors were to be warned that unless production costs were close to the $1.4M goal the A-X 
program might not be approved for the follow-on development and acquisition.  In order to 
achieve cost savings, the specified performance requirements were not to be considered firm 
specifications, but goals “to the extent they are economically feasible.”57
 
  The winning 
contractors, Fairchild Hiller and Northrop, were announced publicly on 18 December 1970.   
 Northrop and Fairchild Hiller each signed firm fixed price contracts to provide two 
prototypes each for the competitive phase of the A-X program.  Northrop received $28.8M for 
the effort, while Fairchild Hiller’s Republic Division received $41.2M.  Part of the reason for the 
difference in amounts was the larger aircraft and more expensive engine (TF-34) associated with 
the Fairchild proposal.  This was the first Air Force development program governed by design-
to-cost principles, and these would be tested from the outset by both contractors.  The Air Force 
gave them wide latitude in making cost/performance trades, specifically with regards to 
instantaneous g’s, takeoff distance, combat radius/loiter, maximum payload and ammunition 
capacity.58
 
   
Table 9. A-X Proposal Summary 
 
3.3.2 Program Initiation for the CAS Gun System 
 AFSC forwarded the recommendations of the CAS Gun System Study Group to the OSD 
in the fall of 1969, and on 5 June 1970, the DDR&E issued Development Concept Paper #103, 
entitled “Close Air Support Gun”.  DCP-103 generally confirmed the study group’s findings, but 
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raised questions associated with foreign candidate gun systems, joint service use, and the 
possibility of a program delay to allow for advanced technology.  The Swiss-made Oerlikon 
304RK 30 mm had been rejected by the study group for a low rate of fire and low reliability, and 
the Vehicle Rapid Fire Weapon System-Successor (VRFWS-S) proposed by the Army was 
unacceptable because previous efforts to use a similar sabot round systemxxi
 
 for airborne 
application had resulted in sabot ingestion by the turbine engines.  Joint service use proved 
elusive as the proposed CAS gun was too big for Navy fighters, and the 30 mm shell was not big 
enough for army applications where penetration of thicker side armor was required.  The 
DDR&E recommended proceeding with a 33 month competitive prototype development phase 
for the proposed gun, but not without the dissent of both the Secretary of the Army and Secretary 
of the Navy.  Packard approved the proposed prototype development pending confirmation of 
Air Force estimates by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group (JTCG) for Munitions 
Effectiveness.  The JTCG provided that confirmation in a summary report dated 3 December 
1970.   
The Armament Development and Test Center released an RFP for a competitive 
prototype development effort on the CAS gun system in April 1971.xxii
 
  This resulted in the 
selection of two contractors, GE and Philco Ford, to enter the competitive phase.  DDR&E 
continued to have reservations with how the gun program would support the A-X development 
and test schedule.  In particular, he noted that the new CAS gun system would not be ready for 
evaluation on the A-X prototypes during the competitive flyoff, and he did not think testing the 
prototypes with the 20 mm M-61 gun could be extrapolated to predict performance with the 30 
mm gun system.  The Air Force revised the gun program in October 1971 to allow for testing of 
the winning gun system in the winning A-X aircraft prior to a production decision.   
Lingering concerns remained regarding the elimination of the Oerlikon 304RK gun from 
consideration.  DDR&E believed that, since it had been in existence for 10 years, it represented a 
lower cost, lower risk alternative.  Internal Air Force and independent Air Force Scientific 
Advisory Board studies had both concluded that it would not be cost effective in the long run due 
to low reliability and high maintenance costs.  Nonetheless, DDR&E persisted and the Air Force 
eventually agreed to test the Oerlikon gun.  The resulting agreement was to test the utility of the 
Oerlikon 304K by April 1973, and it would serve as an alternate gun system should both GE and 
Philco Ford fail to demonstrate an adequate gun system for the A-X.  The Oerlikon 304RK was 
designated by the Air Force as the GAU-9/A, effectively removing it from the competitive 
development effort to build what was designated the GAU-8/A.   
 
Each of the two competitors for the GAU-8/A signed a firm fixed price contract for the 
competitive phase of development.  The contract called for prime contractor responsibility for 
gun system integration, and each contractor was required to deliver three guns with link less feed 
and storage system, electronic control unit, and a family of combat and target practice 
ammunition.  The ammunition development, which was subcontracted, consisted of rounds for 
target practice, high explosive incendiary, semi-armor piercing high explosive, and armor 
                                                 
xxi A sabot is a shoe or sleeve used in a cannon or gun to fire a projectile smaller than the bore diameter. 
xxii An earlier RFP was actually released in October, 1970, but none of the four proposals received were considered 
acceptable.  The best gun design had the worst ammunition, and a mismatch of proposed contract types prevented 
any meaningful comparison. 
 
 
35 
piercing incendiary with steel penetrator.  Concurrently, the Los Alamos Scientific Lab and AAI 
Corporation began joint development of an armor piercing incendiary round with a depleted 
uranium penetrator.  The Air Force placed great importance on both performance and cost 
considerations for the ammunition.  Beyond concerns for the ability to penetrate heavy armor, a 
study done at Eglin AFB during this time frame highlighted the importance of ammunition cost.  
With respect to existing aircraft guns, the report stated: “Research and Development accounted 
for only 1% of the total funds expended over the life of a gun system.  Ammunition for over 
90%, gun investment for 4%, and operation and maintenance for 5%.”59
 
 
The Air Force understood that the fortunes of the A-X and the GAU-8/A were 
intertwined, and recognized the importance of the integration effort given four prime contractors, 
two each for the aircraft and the gun.  It was clear by then that aircraft would be designed to 
accommodate the gun, instead of the gun being chosen to “fit” in the aircraft.  A memorandum of 
agreement was signed on 15 October 1971 between the Aeronautical Systems Division and the 
Armament Development and Test Center designating both the A-X SPO and the Air Force 
Armament Laboratory as responsible for both the management and development of the GAU-
8/A gun.60
 
  Overall management responsibility was given to the A-X SPO, and the Armament 
Laboratory was responsible for technical/engineering support for the GAU-8/A gun system.  A 
GAU-8 Program Manager, located in the Armament Laboratory, was the focal point for support 
to the A-X SPO.  This memorandum of agreement would be expanded in September 1973 to 
include the 30 mm ammunition development programs. 
 
 
Figure 12. The GAU-8/A Gun System 
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3.4   Parallel Undocumented Development – The Competitive Prototypes 
3.4.1 Program Office Activities 
 The small A-X SPO (only about 30 personnel) had large areas of responsibility.  In 
addition to the competitive prototyping of the A-X, they were responsible for the GAU-8/A 
development, and were monitoring parallel development for avionics and the two engines.  The 
engines were to be provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), so in 1972 the Air 
Force would award contractsxxiii to both Lycoming (for the F102 engine) and GE (for the TF34 
engine).61
 
   
Specific ground rules were established by the Air Force to ensure fair competition during 
the competitive prototype phase.  Performance goals were established by the Air Force 
Headquarters, and revisions to those goals could only result from joint contractor SECAF-
appointed panel discussions.  There was to be no communication between the contractors, and 
the SPO would provide equal distribution of information to them.  The contractors were 
authorized to initiate design changes they deemed necessary as long as these changes were in the 
context of the specifics of the contracts.62
3.4.2 The Prototypes 
  The Air Force designated the two contractor’s designs 
as the A-9A (Northrop) and A-10A (Fairchild). 
 The A-9A was a twin turbofan aircraft using the non-afterburning YF102 engines rated at 
7500 lbs of thrust per engine.  It was a high wing design with the engines located under the wing 
root adjacent to the fuselage (see Figure 13.)  The lower thrust YF102 engine cost less than the 
TF34, but the lower thrust required an increase in wing span to meet the low-speed maneuvering 
and take-off distance requirements.xxiv
 
  The design-to-cost goals were evident not only in the 
selection of the lower cost engine, but in the selection of off-the-shelf equipment such as the 
main landing gear struts from the McDonnell Douglas A-4, wheels and brakes from the 
Grumman Gulfstream 2, nose landing gear from the Northrop A-5, and ejection seat from the 
McDonnell Douglas S-3A.  Further evidence of attention paid to production cost was the use of 
interchangeable left and right side parts for engines, control surfaces, and other parts.   
 Survivability features of the A-9A included redundant critical structural members, access 
doors designed to blow out in the event of an internal explosion, redundant hydraulic flight 
controls with manual back-up, foam filled and self sealing fuel tanks, and a “bathtub” of armor 
plating around the cockpit.  Maintenance features included chest high engine placement for ease 
of ground-level service; Northrop engineers speculated that an engine replacement could be 
accomplished in 30 minutes.63
                                                 
xxiii The Lycoming contract was a cost-plus-incentive-fee effort for development through qualification testing of the 
F102 turbofan engine.  The GE contract was a fixed-priced-incentive-fee effort for only qualification testing of the 
TF34 engine as it had already been developed for the Navy S-3 aircraft. 
 
xxiv The YF102 also required further development as compared to the TF34, so the TF34 was selected as the backup 
option for the Northrop design.   
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Figure 13. The YA-9A Prototype 
 
 The A-10A was also a twin-engine turbofan design, with the biggest difference between 
it and the A-9A being the placement of the wing and engines, and the tail configuration (see 
Figure 14.)  The TF34 was a non-afterburning turbofan rated at over 9,000 lbs of thrust, and the 
engines were placed above and behind the wing in pods attached to the outside of the fuselage.  
The high placement of the engines reduced the chance of Foreign Object Damage (FOD) during 
take-off and landing, and also enabled rapid mission turn around on the ground as the engines 
could be left running while rearming.  The rearward placement of the engines reduced the IR 
signature as the exhaust from the engine was partially shielded from view by the tail.  The low 
wing allowed for ease of store loading, and also allowed wing mounted landing gear for a wider 
track and better stability on rough forward area landing strips.64  Fairchild also used 
interchangeable left and right side parts for cost control.  Survivability features included 
redundant hydraulic flight controls with mechanical back-up, a titanium “bathtub” around the 
cockpit, twin vertical stabilizers, foam filled self sealing fuel tanks, and main landing gears that 
partially protruded from nacelles on the wings making gear-up landing less hazardous.  “The 
aircraft is designed to fly with one engine, one tail, one elevator and half a wing torn off.”65
 
  
 On 10 August 1972, the Air Force released proposal instructions for the continued 
development and testing of the CAS aircraft.  Each of the contractors submitted technical and 
cost proposals in October 1972 which were to be used with the results of the competitive fly-off 
to select the single contractor that would go forward with advanced development.   
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Figure 14. The YA-10A Prototype 
3.4.3 Competitive Fly-offs and Shoot-offs 
 The YA-10A made its first flight on 10 May 1972, approximately 17 months after 
contract award.  The YA-9A made its first flight 10 days later.  (See Figures 15, 16.)  Between 
May and October 1972 the contractors flight tested their aircraft, accumulating 162 hours on the 
YA-9A and 190 hours on the YA-10A.  The fly-off between the two aircraft was conducted at 
Edwards AFB, CA between 10 October and 9 December 1972.  “During this period the A-9A 
crews flew 123 sorties for a total of 146 flight hours and the A-10A was flown 87 sorties for a 
total of 138.5 flight hours.”66
 
  Both aircraft utilized an internal M61 20 mm Gatling Gun in place 
of the developmental GAU-8/A which was not ready for testing.  The fly-off was intended to 
task the aircraft with difficult flying conditions in order to magnify the differences in design.  
While not a primary goal of the fly-off, weapon delivery accuracy was evaluated and both 
aircraft were found to perform adequately with only minor differences between them. 
 
Figure 15. YA-9A Flight Test 
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 With little performance differences between the two aircraft, the source selection decision 
rested on other factors.  The A-10 was judged to have better ground handling capability – a result 
of the low wing design and more ordnance space on the larger wing.  The Air Force also 
believed the A-10 to be closer to production, thus allowing for faster progress in the test 
program.67  Other comments made at the DSARC review included Secretary Seamans statement 
to the effect that the simpler design of the A-10 was more likely to allow achievement of the 
$1.4M unit flyaway cost, and DDR&E Foster commented that the pilots who had flown both 
prototypes preferred the A-10 for combat operations.68  On 18 January 1973, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Kenneth Rush authorized the Air Force to make a source selection announcement, 
and also directed the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) to estimate the cost of the 
entire remaining program.  The CAIG presented the results of its review to the DSARC on 8 
February 1973.  They estimated a unit flyaway cost of $1.7M (FY70$), with an uncertainty range 
of $1.5M to $2.0M.  The SPO estimate was $1.5M, while the contractor estimate was $1.4M.  
The DSARC recommended approval of the full scale development contract and a design-to-cost 
goal of $1.5M total flyaway cost (recurring prime mission equipment cost plus SE, program 
management, and system test and evaluation) with contractual incentives to achieve or come 
under the cost goal.  The resulting procurement program, however, was based on the CAIG’s 
most probable cost of $1.7M.  The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved full-scale 
development of the A-10 on 28 February 1973, and on 1 March the Air Force awarded a cost-
plus-incentive-fee contract for approximately $160M.  On the same day GE was awarded a 
fixed-price-incentive-fee contract for approximately $28M to develop and deliver 32 TF34 
engines. 69xxv
 
 
 
Figure 16. The YA-10A on Landing 
                                                 
xxv Notably, the showdown between the Army and the Air Force with regards to competition between the AH-56 
Cheyenne and the A-X never came to a head.  Lockheed encountered major development problems with the AH-56, 
and a Senate report in 1972 recommending funding for the A-X and the Marine AV-8 (but not the AH-56), 
effectively ended the program.  By the end of 1972, the Army had already issued an RFP for a new anti-armor attack 
helicopter which would eventually see service as the AH-64 Apache. 
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 Shortly after the competitive A-X fly-off, the GAU-8/A “shoot-off” between GE and 
Philco Ford began.  The gun competition was conducted at Eglin AFB from 3 January to 6 April 
1973.  Air Force evaluation teams fired and maintained the guns, with contractors acting only in 
an advisory capacity.  Each contractor supplied three guns (two for evaluation, one for backup 
and spare parts) and 100,000 rounds of Target Practice ammunition.  The programmed test called 
for 70,000 rounds to be fired for each design – 35,000 rounds each for the two guns supplied for 
testing by each contractor.  The GE supplied guns fired over 70,000 rounds, but the Philco Ford 
guns fired less than 16,000 rounds due to repeated jamming.  The GE guns averaged 8,800 
rounds between failure, while the Philco Ford guns averaged only 728.  The GE design met or 
exceeded the performance expectations in all areas except weight.  The gun weight increased 
from 367 to 591 lbs, and the total system weight from 2607 to 3885.  Despite this weight growth, 
the GE design was declared operationally suitable and GE was declared the winner of the 
prototype competition. 
 
GE handily beat Philco Ford in the GAU-8/A competition, but still had to wait for 
conclusion of the test firings of the Oerlikon 304RK gun (designated the GAU-9/A).  The 
Oerlikon gun didn’t fare much better than the Philco Ford design.  Table 10 shows the 
comparison of the test results for the GAU-8 and GAU-9 gun competition.  The GAU-8 numbers 
correspond to the GE designed system.  The DSARC reviewed the GAU-8/A program on 5 June 
1973 and recommended proceeding with full-scale development of the gun and ammunition.  On 
21 June GE was awarded a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract for approximately $24M.  The 
contract was to deliver seven preproduction gun assemblies and to refurbish the three prototype 
guns.  GE was also responsible for the development and limited production of a family of 30 mm 
ammunition.  One of the provisions of the contract approval was that GE bring on a second 
subcontractor for ammunition development.xxvi
 
  Already teamed with Aerojet for ammunition 
development, GE subcontracted with Honeywell to provide a second source.  Honeywell was 
well positioned to do this as they were subcontracted to Philco Ford for the competitive 
prototype development phase.  The cost of the second source for the ammunition development 
was $17M in RDT&E.  
Table 10. Performance Comparison of the GAU-8/A and GAU-9/A70 
 
 
                                                 
xxvi In the milestone II review, the DSARC had expressed concern that ammunition costs, especially those associated 
with the armor piercing incendiary round could be held to Air Force estimates. 
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3.5   Full Scale Development 
3.5.1 Program Management 
 Following the decision to proceed with full-scale development, the A-X SPO was re-
designated the A-10 SPO, and two months after that it was re-designated the Deputate for A-10.  
Manning for the SPO had purposely been kept lean during the competitive prototype phase, but 
Brigadier General Thomas McMullen, newly promoted and named Deputy for A-10, requested 
organizational changes to the SPO and an increase in manpower.71
3.5.2 The A-10/A-7D Fly-off 
  Procurement and production 
functions were split into separate directorates, and functional divisions were established within 
those directorates.  Manning, which had grown slightly by mid 1973 to about 60 SPO personnel 
and 30 co-located personnel, would double in size over the next year.   
 During review of the FY74 RDT&E budget in September 1973, Congress raised concerns 
about the A-10 production cost and its lack of versatility.  The A-7D had performed well during 
its deployments to Vietnam, and budgets for fighters were being stretched by development and 
production of multiple fighter and attack aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marines (not to 
mention Army helicopters).  Underpinning this concern was a rivalry between Fairchild (the A-
10 contractor from Long Island, NY) and LTV Corporation (the A-7 contractor from Dallas, TX) 
and their congressional supporters.  Congress wanted a fly-off between the A-10 and the A-7D 
(in production for the Air Force since 1967), but the Air Force and the OSD did not believe that a 
fly-off would produce meaningful information beyond what was being obtained from ongoing  
A-10 testing.  The Air Force also stressed that extensive studies had shown the superior 
survivability of the A-10, and that both the A-7D and F-4 lacked characteristics they were 
looking for in the A-10.72  The A-10 contractor was also opposed to a fly-off stating, among 
other reasons, concern over the “ability of anyone to convince special interest Congressmen of 
the need for specific flight handling characteristics for performing the close air support mission, 
survivability, and other close air support performance parameters, especially when they are not 
directly evaluated through flying.”73
 
  Nonetheless, in September 1973 the Air Force agreed to 
comply with Congressional recommendations.   
The main point of the fly-off was to have experienced pilots fly both the YA-10 
prototype and the A-7D and provide an assessment of which aircraft they would prefer in a 
combat environment.  The new DDR&E, Malcolm Currie, and the Deputy Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering for Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) worked with the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group (WSEG) to develop guidance for the fly-off.  The Air Force was to conduct 
the fly-off in a realistic combat environment (scenarios, terrain, weather) and the Army was to 
provide realistic ground equipment (targets, surrogate Air Defense systems, and related support).  
The flights were scheduled for the Spring of 1974 by which time the A-10 was expected to be 
qualified for maximum load factor at some (but not all) gross weights, qualification tests for 
some ordnance carriage would be complete, and limited communication equipment and the 
depressed reticle sight would be installed.  Missing from the prototype, however, was the GAU-
8/A gun, a head-up display, the Maverick missile system, and various IR and electronic 
countermeasure equipment.  Probably because of the limitations of the prototype A-10, the 
DDR&E “added a second purpose to the evaluation by directing that: Using the fly-off results, 
together with other pertinent data, the Air Force and the WSEG will each develop for the 
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DDT&E an analysis of the test results and overall evaluation of the relative effectiveness of the 
A-7 and A-10 in close air support.”74
 
  
The fly-off was conducted between 15 April and 9 May 1974.  Four experienced pilots 
were chosen, none of which had previously flown either the A-7D or the YA-10.  The aircraft 
operated out of McConnell AFB, Kansas, and the ground targets and simulated air defenses were 
located at Fort Riley, Kansas.  Fort Riley was chosen due to similarities with the European 
theater, and it had adequate air space and range instrumentation.  The fly-off tested three aircraft 
configurations: heavy (12 MK 82 500 lb bombs), medium (6 MK 82’s) and clean.  Bomb release 
as well as missile release and gun firing were simulated.  Weather ceilings simulated included 
unlimited, 5,000 ft, 3,000 ft, and 1,000 ft.  Each aircraft flew a total of 160 passes over the 
simulated battlefields.  Data collected for the flights included Range Measurement System II, 
Cooper Harper (handling quality) ratings, and pilot summaries.   
 
The flight test results confirmed the Air Force’s belief that a specialized close air support 
aircraft offered distinct advantages.  While all the test pilots preferred the A-7D to the YA-10 for 
situations of unlimited ceiling/unlimited visibility, for low ceiling/low visibility conditions the 
maneuverability of the A-10 allowed them to operate and maintain visual contact with the target.  
The conclusion of the evaluation report was: “On the basis of the Fort Riley test, the analysis 
produced the observation that the YA-10 prototype was the overall more effective aircraft.  This 
observation is based on calculations of relative lethality in the attack of targets and relative 
attrition to defenses experienced by both aircraft used in the test.”75  With respect to the 
secondary purpose: “This analysis produced the observation that the A-10A will be a more 
effective and more cost-effective close air support aircraft than the A-7D in a combined arms 
conflict.”76
 
  The high cost effectiveness was a result of higher lethality, lower attrition and higher 
expected sortie rates for the A-10A.  The report noted that the A-10A was less costly than the A-
7D both in terms of acquisition cost as well as life cycle cost.  Of note, the GAU-8/A gun was a 
significant factor in the evaluation as the 20 mm gun in the A-7D was ineffective against 
armored targets. 
Despite emerging as the clear winner of the fly-off with the A-7D, critics of the A-10 
program remained and continued their vocal opposition.  Beginning in 1974, political pressure 
was being applied for the Air Force to consider the Piper Enforcerxxvii as a cheaper alternative to 
the A-10.  Influential newspaper publisher David Lindsay joined forces with Piper aircraft 
President Lynn Helms, US Senator Strom Thurmond and others during the mid to late 1970s to 
continue to apply pressure on an A-10 program which by then was experiencing cost growth.77
                                                 
xxvii The Piper Enforcer, which had a strong resemblance to the WWII era P-51 Mustang, was designed and 
originally flown by David Lindsay, owner of Cavalier Aircraft.  Lindsay sold the program to Piper Aircraft in 1970 
but remained involved in the project after the closure of Cavalier in 1971.  The original prototype Piper Enforcers 
were heavily modified P-51’s with a single turboprop engine. The Enforcer was evaluated, but rejected, as a 
counterinsurgency aircraft by the Air Force in the early 1970s.  Two later prototypes built in the 1980s were larger 
and had much less in common with the P-51.  
  
It did not seem to matter that the Enforcer would require significant development in order to 
make it suitable for the A-10 mission, and even then it would carry less payload and likely still 
be more vulnerable than the A-10.  At one point “some members of Congress considered 
offering the Enforcer to the Army if the Air Force refused, but the Army backed away, 
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apparently fearing another roles-and-missions fight.”78
 
  A flight test of the Enforcer was finally 
pushed on the Air Force in 1984, but the Air Force again concluded that it was not as good as the 
A-10, and by then A-10 production was ending. 
 
Figure 17.  Pre-production and Prototype A-10s 
 
3.5.3 GAU-8/A Compatibility Testing 
 Full scale development and integration of the GAU-8/A gun system with the A-10A was 
broken down into three parts.79
 
  Part I involved integrating the GAU-8/A prototype gun into the 
YA-10 and conducting ground and flight testing prior to a production decision.  Part II included 
the full scale development of the GAU-8/A gun system and ammunition leading to ground 
qualification of pre-production systems.  After development testing a Critical Design Review 
(CDR) would be conducted to determine what changes would be required for the production 
design to be compatible with the production A-10.  Part III included support for the A-10 
Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Initial Operation Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).  
Part III would utilize pre-production gun systems in the A-10 DT&E aircraft. 
 Ground firings of the refurbished prototype guns in a highly instrumented nose section of 
a YA-10 were conducted in December 1973 and January 1974.  No problems were reported, and 
subsequent ground tests of a second gun installed in a YA-10 at Edwards AFB, CA, also resulted 
in no problems.  Flight testing with both YA-10s was conducted in February and March 1974, 
also at Edwards AFB.  No major compatibility problems were noted, but a secondary gun gas 
ignition problem was noted.  This caused a flame area in front of the aircraft, obstructing pilot 
vision and causing fluctuations in the engine pressure.  Initial attempts to correct the problem by 
lengthening the gun barrels and using plastic bonded ammunition (as opposed to copper) failed 
to correct the problem (although the plastic bands were expected to extend the barrel life by 
cutting friction and corrosive blowby).80  A double-baffled deflector was added but still failed to 
eliminate the engine perturbations.  The final fix for the problem involved adding a potassium 
nitrate suppressant to the ammunition propellant.  Follow-on tests with the new ammunition 
propellant mixture confirmed success in resolving the problem.  Of note, the solution to the gun 
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gas ignition problem created a second problem; excessive residue from the gun firing covered the 
canopy and impaired vision.81
 
  The solution to this turned out to be far easier; a windshield 
washer was installed on the front of the canopy and was found to be operationally acceptable.  
Procedures for washing the engine with water were also developed as the residue (potassium 
bicarbonate) was found to be water soluble.   
 A second integration problem identified had to do with the gun pointing angle.  Test 
pilots had reported that the gun angle was not right for low dive angle and low slant range 
strafing.  Strafing at larger angles and slant ranges was satisfactory, but pilots were unable to 
concentrate bursts under low dive angle/low slant range employment.  Flight tests conducted in 
June 1974 demonstrated that a 2 degree change in gun alignment would correct the problem.  
The gun alignment problem, with the proposed fix, was briefed at the DSARC IIIAxxviii 
3.5.4 The Armor Piercing Round 
review in 
July 1974.  The fix for the alignment problem was implemented, and subsequent flight test 
indicated optimum gun alignment for the A-10 attack profile.   
An armor piercing round had always been considered one of the principle development 
challenges associated with the GAU-8/A.  The armor piercing round with the steel core was 
proving to be ineffective against tank targets, and was eliminated from further development by 
the time of the full scale development awards.  The second development approach being pursued 
against the tank challenge was the depleted uranium penetrator.  The Air Force considered this a 
significant risk given the schedule for the A-10, so a tungsten carbide round was pursued as a 
backup.  As a result of the June 1973 DSARC II review, GE was to take on two competitive 
subcontractors for ammunition development, with each of these subs developing target practice, 
high explosive incendiary, and armor piercing rounds, to include processes for manufacturing 
depleted uranium penetrators for the armor piercing rounds.  Further, each of the subs was to 
obtain two supply sources for case, propellant and penetrator.82 The cost of all this increased the 
estimated cost of ammunition development from $9.2M to $15M.  As a further risk mitigation 
effort, the Air Force Armament Lab conducted a parallel full-scale development effort with 
contractors to provide high density penetrators, improved propellants, and alternative cartridge 
designs.  Aggressive risk and cost reduction measures such as these (and others) reportedly 
allowed the program office to reduce the GAU-8/A round cost to $15 each, representing an 80% 
reduction from the original cost estimate!83
 
 
 Despite the Secretary of Defense approval in April 1972 for selected use of depleted 
uranium in munitions, concerns still lingered and a further study was requested by DDR&E in 
October 1973.xxix  The objective of the study was “to foresee and be prepared to answer the many 
questions that may be raised within the DoD, the Public Health Service, Congress and the public 
with regard to DU use in munitions.”84  In addition to consideration of combat use, the report 
considered “the environmental and medical considerations associated with manufacture, storage, 
use, and disposal of depleted uranium munitions.”85
                                                 
xxviii DSARC IIIA was an OSD review in advance of limited production.  DSARC IIIB reviews were conducted prior 
to a full rate production decision. 
  The report indicated no significant impact 
xxix The study addressed not only use of the DU round for the GAU-8/A gun system, but the Navy Phalanx and 
Army Bushmaster guns as well. 
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(environmental or medical) from normal use; however “Depending on conditions locally, 
significant impact can occur in the event of uncontrolled release of DU.”86
 
   
 Manufacturing technology programs were initiated to reduce the cost and risk associated 
with the depleted uranium penetrator.  A joint program between the Army and Air Force looked 
at machining them from bar stock using production equipment.  The Battelle Institute examined 
casting and forging as lower cost fabrication techniques as well.  The results of these 
investigations were shared with Aerojet and Honeywell, the two ammunition subcontractors.  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved Air Force use of the depleted uranium armor piercing 
rounds for testing following the DSARC IIIA review of the A-10 program in July 1974.   
 
 
Figure 18. A-10A Firing the GAU-8/A   
 
3.6 Production and Deployment 
3.6.1 Production Readiness Issues 
Fairchild Airplane Manufacturing Corporation was founded in 1926 in Farmingdale, New 
York.   During World War II, it had many successful designs with the M-62 initial flight trainer 
being the most successful with over eight thousand being produced.  The company had plants in 
Farmingdale, New York and Hagerstown, Maryland.  Following World War II, they were 
successful with a series of large capacity troop carriers.  By 1961, they had expanded into space 
applications and by 1964 had acquired Hiller Aircraft, a helicopter manufacturer.  In 1965, the 
company took over Republic Aviation which had produced many bombers in World War II but 
had since been reduced to doing subcontract work.87
 
 
When the A-10 full scale development contract was awarded the company had been 
waiting while other work was drying up.   Fairchild had not been running a full production line 
since the termination of the F-105, nine years earlier.  This did not seem to be a concern to either 
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Fairchild or the Air Force at the time.88  The Air Force conducted a customary pre-award survey 
of Fairchild’s capacity, capability, and financial condition, and the company was rated as 
satisfactory.  In fact, the company later proved itself to have many deficiencies which were to 
have long term consequences, and most of these were or should have been noted during the pre-
award survey.  Some historians have stated that the decision to pick Fairchild-Republic was 
based on which company could best stand a contract rejection.89  Vincent Tizio, program 
manager at time of the fly-off, admitted that the cost factor dictated much of what they were 
doing – “we made many, many trade-offs studies on cost, maintainability, and performance.”90  
Republic did take the program very seriously.  They set up a screened off “Tiger Works” to 
create a facsimile of Lockheed’s “Skunk Works”.  However, there had not been any capital 
investment in the plant.  When the Air Force finally took a hard look they became concerned 
and, in 1973, sent a team to investigate both the Farmingdale NY and Hagerstown MD facilities.  
The team concluded that although Fairchild might have the competence to perform the research, 
development, test, and evaluation program, they lacked the capability to perform the production 
phase.  A second report, seven months later, indicated that although some progress had been 
made, there was a refusal on the part of Fairchild to provide information about a proposed 
consolidation of the Farmington and Hagerstown plants.  Serious doubts were growing about 
Fairchild’s ability to meet the contract.91
3.6.2 Hails Report and Recommendations 
 
 Tactical Air Command Vice Commander, Lieutenant General Robert Hails, was 
appointed to head a committee of experienced civilian and military professionals to review the 
program.  No one on the committee had prior experience with the A-10 to ensure impartiality.  
Their findings were released on September 30, 1974 and were very critical of Fairchild from the 
experience and competence of the employees, outdated plant, to the structure and experience of 
top management.  Some of the findings of the report are as follows:92
 
 
• The top level management of Fairchild was market-oriented and neither experienced nor 
structured to manufacture the A-10.  In particular, it was noted that the A-10 program 
director had no direct control over either the Farmingdale or Hagerstown production 
facilities; 
• The integration of the two production facilities was dependent on the company president 
that resided at neither of the facilities. 
 
The SPO, the Air Force Plant Representative Office (AFPRO), and the Air Force Contract 
Management Division (AFCMD) were also cited for their lack of coordination, which was 
deemed to have affected Fairchild’s responsiveness.  Financial problems were also uncovered 
which projected a $12M overrun, and schedule problems associated with the first six aircraft 
were occurring due to late receipt of key components from Fairchild’s vendors.   
 
The committee made a number of recommendations to both the SPO and Fairchild, 
including replacing a number of top managers at Fairchild.93   Fairchild made other changes, to 
include establishing executive vice president control of all technical and production aspects of 
the A-10, and placing the Hagerstown plant under the authority of Farmingdale.  Fairchild also 
undertook major capital investment, “replacing its overaged machinery and increasing its 
make/buy ratio for major machined parts for the A-10 from 23:77 to about 55:34.”94  Some of 
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the cost of the investment was financed via the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center, with 
the rest coming from company funds.  On the Air Force side, additional manpower was approved 
for both the SPO and the AFPRO, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems at AFSC was 
established as the focal point for reporting and coordination between the SPO and the AFPRO.   
 
One recommendation of the Hails report was that additional production capacity for the 
A-10 be established.  This became infeasible at the Farmingdale plant as the new machining 
capability reduced the amount of space available for assembly.95  Originally the plan had been 
for 90 percent of the production to be in Farmingdale, but in one of his last acts the outgoing 
president of Fairchild, Charles Collisxxx, suggested that between 20 and 41 per cent of the 
production should be reassigned to Hagerstown.  The reasons stated for the reassignment of 
production were the avoidance of additional capitalization that would be required at 
Farmingdale, the lower labor rates at Hagerstown, and lower overhead rates due to lower 
property taxes at Hagerstown.  While the reasons may have been valid, they did not satisfy New 
York congressmen who were concerned about the possible loss of 1,000 jobs from the state.   
The recommendations were studied by the Air Force in January and February 1975, and in 
March the Air Force reported that is was “not adverse” to move some of the workload to 
Hagerstown.96
 
 
 
Figure 19. A-10 Fuselage and Wing Production 
 
                                                 
xxx Charles Collis was replaced as President of Fairchild-Republic Division in March 1975, in the wake of the top 
management shake up that occurred at the end of 1974. 
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3.6.3 DSARC Reviews and Production Decisions 
On 9 July 1974 the DSARC met to assess plans for low rate production of the A-10 
aircraft, the GAU-8/A gun and 30 mm ammunition.  Excellent progress had been made with 
respect to the design and test, but concerns regarding achievement of design-to-cost goals 
remained.  At that time Fairchild was predicting a $24.3M overrun, with $17M of that to be 
passed to the Government.  The SPO estimate at this time for the unit flyaway cost was $1.6M 
(FY70$, 600 aircraft buy), but both the OSD CAIG and an independent Air Force cost estimate 
came in at $1.7M.   Part of the reason for the increase from the $1.5M goal was a 1,000 lb 
increase in the weight since the DSARC II review.  The Air Force argued that the cost increase 
was within limits since the program was budgeted according to the $1.7M per direction from the 
DSARC II decision.  On 31 July 1974, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clemens authorized the Air 
Force to proceed with initial production using $39M for long lead funding.  The Air Force was 
given approval to procure 52 aircraft providing that “contract options to procure a smaller 
quantity (that is, 28 aircraft) be kept open”97 pending completion of remaining tests and the 
Critical Design Review (CDR) for the armor piercing round.  The DSARC met again in 
November 1974 to review closure of these issues.  By then the GAU-8/A deficiencies with 
regards to the gun depression angle and secondary gun gas ignition had been resolved, and 
engine qualification tests for the TF-34 were completed on 31 October 1974.  The CDR for the 
armor piercing round had not been completed, but was scheduled to be completed by Aerojet in 
December 1974.xxxi
 
  Based on this review, the Air Force was authorized to proceed with FY75 
and FY76 production of 52 aircraft.  The FY75 purchase of 30 mm ammunition was authorized 
pending successful completion of the CDR for the armor piercing round.   
A two month delay in the first flight of the DT&E aircraft caused a subsequent delay in 
the DSARC IIIB review from October 1975 to February 1976.  Required tests prior to the full-
rate production decision included:98
 
 
• Freedom from flutter 
• Initial performance measurements 
• Flying qualities 
• GAU-8/A-10 accuracy 
• Ammunition performance (vs. tanks, trucks and APC’sxxxii)
• Bombing accuracy 
 
• Laser spot seeker (PAVE PENNYxxxiii) integration 
• Aerial refueling 
• IOT&E. 
 
By the end of 1975, the one remaining issue was fatigue testing.  The aircraft undergoing fatigue 
testing developed cracks on the fuselage frame at about 80 per cent of the desired 6,000 hour 
mark.  A reinforcement corrected the problem, and the 6,000 hour objective was achieved on 28 
October 1975.  The reinforcement was to be retrofitted to several existing and pre-production 
                                                 
xxxi Aerojet completed the CDR for the armor piercing round in December 1974.  Honeywell, the second 
ammunition subcontractor, would not complete its CDR for the armor piercing round until October 1975. 
xxxii APC: Armored Personnel Carrier 
xxxiii PAVE PENNY is a target acquisition aid for guiding the pilot towards targets designated from the ground using 
a laser target designator.   
 
 
49 
aircraft, and the amended production process was to be in place by mid-1976 to support aircraft 
#14 and beyond.99  With this issue resolved, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements authorized 
full-rate production at a maximum rate of 15 aircraft per month.  This was a reduction from the 
Air Force’s proposed rate of 20 per month based on the assessments of the contractor’s ability to 
finance and produce efficiently.100
 
  On 30 March 1976 the Commander of the Tactical Air 
Command accepted the first production A-10 from the Commander of Air Force Systems 
Command. 
 Full rate production approval for the GAU-8/A gun system and ammunition was given in 
March 1976.  Under the approved program, the dual source subcontract arrangement for 
ammunition would continue through FY77.  As the only source having completed qualification 
testing by then, Aerojet would remain the sole source for FY75 production, and a 60/40 split to 
Aerojet/Honeywell would be used for FY76 and FY77 production.  The subcontractor 
arrangement for ammunition (with GE as the prime) would continue until FY78.  Beginning in 
FY78 the Air Force would buy ammunition directly using competitive contracts with the two 
suppliers. 
3.6.4 Variant Considerations and Production End 
 As the threat focus changed to the European Battlefield some of the earlier considerations 
were being looked at again.   The lack of “relaxed stability” in prolonged manual flying was 
putting a strain on pilots.  An inertial navigation system, weapons delivery computer, built-in 
drag chute, upgraded avionics and Heads-Up Display (HUD) were added.  A two seat variant, 
the YA-10B, was developed by Fairchild for Night/Adverse Weather (N/AW) and use as a 
trainer.  Proposed changes for the N/AW variant, in addition to the two-place cockpit, included 
ground mapping radar, a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod, and larger vertical stabilizers.  
The only YA-10B actually built was a modified pre-production A-10A (see Figure 20).  While 
the Air Force flight tested the YA-10B in 1979, they chose not to pursue further development of 
the two seat variant.  In the 1980s the OA-10 Observation and Reconnaissance conversion was 
introduced.  The alterations necessary were relatively minor and inexpensive to implement.  
These were mostly internal although there was modification in the pylon loading to allow 
phosphorus marker rockets to replace the Mavericks and bombs. 
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Figure 20. Flight Testing the YA-10B 
 
In 1982 Congress voted to discontinue all funding to the A-10 with the Fiscal 1983 
Defense Authorization Bill, and line termination costs of $29 million were provided.  By this 
time the F-16 was the “darling” of the Air Force, and there were few proponents within the 
service for continued production of the A-10.  Fairchild lobbied Congress in an attempt to get the 
decision reversed.  The Reagan administration had sought funds for thirty A-10s in 1983 and an 
additional twenty in 1984 but was not successful.  Fairchild had planned on selling seventy plus 
A-10s to foreign countries but was unable to do so.  The final aircraft (No. 713 s/n 82-0665) 
rolled off the line in March of 1984 and ended eleven years of production.  This was the last 
plane to be built in the Hagerstown, MD plant.  Fairchild did get the contract for the T-46A 
trainer but when the first presentation of the aircraft was made in 1985 it turned out to be not 
much more than a hollow shell.  Although the later flight test revealed a good aircraft, the 
company had sacrificed a lot to get to that point and was in serious financial trouble.  Costs of 
the T-46A program were escalating and the program was cancelled in 1987.  Fairchild entered 
talks with Grumman and Boeing to sell off the aircraft division, and did end up selling the rights 
to the A-10 program to Grumman in 1987.  After 60 years of business the Hagerstown plant was 
shut down, and Fairchild ceased to continue as an aircraft company.101
3.7   Retirement Plans, Operations, Sustainment … and Life Extension 
 
3.7.1 The Continuing Debate over the CAS Aircraft 
By the time A-10 production ended in the early 1980s, several developments began to 
rekindle the debate over the optimum CAS aircraft.  The F-16 aircraft was proving its mettle 
both in training with the US and in actual combat with the Israeli Air Force.  In particular, its 
successful use by the Israelis in both ground attack (the 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear power 
plant) and in air-to-air combat (the 1982 Bekaa valley campaign) re-energized proponents for 
fast multi-role fighters.  Further, the F-16 was relatively low cost compared to the other new 
fighters of the era such as the F-15 and the Navy F-14.  The second development which fueled 
 
 
51 
the debate was the Army’s unveiling of its AirLand Battle Doctrine in 1982.  The AirLand Battle 
envisioned a much faster and free flowing battle without a traditional battle line.  The Army 
intended to use both firepower and maneuverability to slow the Soviet advance and 
simultaneously attack their reserve troops before they could be used to engage friendly forces, 
forcing the attacking troops to either retreat or surrender.  This put a much greater emphasis on 
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), which favored a faster aircraft and required less reliance on 
direct coordination with ground troops.  Also in this timeframe, the Army had been given 
approval to begin production of the AH-64 Apache helicopter, the successor to the failed AH-56 
Cheyenne program.  While the AH-64 was less ambitious than the AH-56, it was to provide the 
Army with the organic close support fire they had long sought.  All of these developments 
caused leaders in the Air Force to question whether or not the A-10 was the CAS aircraft needed 
for the future.   
 
By 1985 the Air Force completed the first of several studies which suggested that a 
modified variant of the F-16, labeled the A-16, would be a good choice for a CAS aircraft to 
support the AirLand Battle.  Other authors have written that the idea for the A-16 actually 
originated about the time that the Army unveiled the AirLand Battle doctrine.
xxxiv
102  The 1985 
report stated that it expected the A-10 would lose its effectiveness in mid to high intensity 
conflicts by the mid 1990s.  Specific concerns were survivability against new Surface-to-Air 
Missiles, the ability to perform air interdiction, and the ability to operate in night and adverse 
weather.  
 
 A modification of an existing aircraft that could be fielded in the mid 1990s was 
considered necessary to avoid competition with the top new fighter development priority; the 
Advanced Tactical Fighter (precursor program for the F-22).   The 1985 report was followed in 
December 1986 with an Air Force recommendation to OSD to replace the A-10 with the A-16.   
While Air Force leaders were certainly behind the A-16 concept, others were less 
anxious.  OSD was critical of the Air Force proposal for not giving full consideration to other 
candidate aircraft, and disapproved the Air Force recommendation.xxxv  An Air Force Scientific 
Advisory Board (SAB) report also raised concerns, concluding that CAS and BAI missions are 
sufficiently different for each to warrant a separate aircraft.  The SAB recommended pursuing a 
new specialized CAS aircraft for the future, while modifying the A-10 with advanced avionics 
and more powerful engines for the short term.  OSD directed the Air Force to perform a Close 
Air Support Aircraft Design Alternative (CASDA) study, and created the Close Air Support 
Mission Area Review Group (CASMARG) to ensure the Air Force considered other alternatives 
besides the A-16.  In December 1987, the Air Force issued a request for concept proposals and 
received proposals from 9 manufacturers, including Fairchild Republic.  Fairchild was not 
awarded a study contract due, in part, to their recent problems executing the T-46 program.   
OSD remained skeptical of the program, and Congress raised questions as well, requesting a 
GAO study on the status of the Air Force’s efforts to replace the A-10.103
                                                 
xxxiv Of note, the Air Force had rejected the Night/Adverse Weather variant of the A-10 just a few years earlier, and 
would continue to rate the A-16 with advanced night and adverse weather avionics more favorably than the A-10 for 
which few were interested in considering the same avionics upgrades.  A later proposal also added a 30 mm gun pod 
to the F-16 to provide “tank-busting” capability. 
  The GAO report noted 
that the intended start of the A-10 replacement, 1993, occurred earlier than the service or 
structural life required.  The Air Force had already started converting A-10s to OA-10 Forward 
xxxv The OSD did approve the development and testing of two modified A-7 prototypes for the CAS mission.   
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Air Controller (FAC) use, but the amount and rate at which the conversion would occur was 
dependent upon the A-10 replacement effort.  The OSD appointed CASMARG did not concur 
with the requirement for a mid 1990s date for A-10 replacement, and this was noted in the GAO 
study.  Despite the many misgivings on the Air Force replacement plans, the GAO report made 
no recommendation, and the CAS replacement aircraft debate went on.   
 
xxxvi
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY88-89 directed the Secretary of Defense 
to provide a CAS/BAI master plan by the end of 1989.  Later amendments associated with base 
realignment and closures furthered directed examination of transferring the A-10 and the CAS 
mission to the Army.  To resolve which aircraft was best suited to perform the mission in the 
future, it directed that OSD’s OT&E directorate plan a competitive flyoff between candidate 
aircraft.104  Hearings and studies continued through 1989, and the planned flyoff added more and 
more aircraft (A-10, F-16, A-7, AV-8, F/A-18) and extended the time over which it would occur 
(6 years in duration, starting in 1995).  The Air Force continued to push for the A-16, so OSD 
called for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)  which was to make an acquisition decision by 
April 1990.  The DAB decision was pushed back to the fall of 1990, but by then there were two 
other world developments that began to influence the debate.  First, the fall of 1989 saw the 
beginning of the breakup of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe, with German reunification 
occurring in October 1990. 
3.7.2 
 Second, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and three days later 
President Bush initiated Operation Desert Shield by sending US troops to the Middle East to 
prevent further advance of Iraqi troops into Saudi Arabia.  When the DAB finally made its 
decision in fall 1990, it was a compromise.  The Air Force would retain two wings of A-10s, and 
it would retrofit up to four wings of F-16’s to perform the CAS and BAI missions.   
Desert Storm and Post War Assessments 
By almost all accounts, the A-10, its pilots, and its ground crews performed very well in 
Desert Shield and the second phase of the war, Desert Storm.  In addition to flying CAS 
missions, it conducted BAI missions in Kuwait and Southern Iraq, combat air patrols looking for 
SCUD mobile missile launchers, armed reconnaissance, and armed escort for search and rescue 
missions.  Despite a lack of avionics for night missions, A-10 pilots adapted by using the display 
from their infrared Maverick missiles.  The GAO reported that the A-10 had the highest sortie 
rate, with an average of 1.4 sorties per aircraft per day, and delivered more guided munitions 
(almost 5,000 Maverick missiles) than any other aircraft type.105  The GAO report also indicated 
that the number of A-10 sorties was likely undercounted, indicating an even higher achieved 
sortie rate was likely.  While the gun was considered effective, the number of gun “kills” was 
unclear due to conservative rules for performing Bomb Damage Assessment during and after the 
war.  An Iraqi regimental commander described the A-10 as “the single most recognizable and 
feared aircraft”, noting its ability to conduct multiple raids per day, loiter around the battlefield, 
and attack with deadly accuracy.106  The A-10 survivability was also generally confirmed: “… 
the Hog’s redundant flight control system allowed crippled planes to fly home.  Aircraft Battle 
Damage Repair (ABDR) crews repaired in-theater all but one of the estimated seventy damaged 
A-10s during this war – and of those, twenty suffered significant damage.  These repairs were 
usually quick, and used cheap, accessible materials.”107
 
  (See Figures 21, 22.) 
                                                 
xxxvi The DAB was the successor to the DSARC. 
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Notably, twenty four F-16A/B aircraft of the 174th
 
 Tactical Fighter Wing were converted 
to a CAS configuration prior to deployment in Desert Storm.  They carried a pod-mounted GAU-
13/A four barrel derivative of the GAU-8/A, with 353 rounds of 30 mm ammunition and a 
PAVE PENNY laser target acquisition system.  The “CAS” F-16’s did not perform well in 
Desert Storm.  The pylon mounted gun was not as steady as the A-10’s rigid mounting, resulting 
in shaking of the aircraft which made it hard to control the round placement.  The higher speed 
of the F-16 also did not provide enough time when approaching a target for gun engagements.  
After several days of operations the gun pods were removed, and the “CAS” F-16’s went back to 
more standard F-16 operations.  While F-16’s in general performed well in Desert Storm, this 
effectively ended plans for the A-16 variants.  
xxxvii
Post Desert Storm, the CAS roles and missions debate lived on.  Air Force Chief of Staff 
General Merrill McPeak favored giving the CAS mission (and the A-10) to the Army, but he 
wanted the Army to give up the deep strike missions with the Army Tactical Missile System 
(ATACMS).  He was outvoted by the other service chiefs and his sweeping recommendations for 
roles and missions realignment would not be implemented.  
 
 The Air Force made a decision 
to keep the A-10 in the active duty force, albeit in smaller numbers due to an overall reduction in 
combat wings in the Air Force.  Beginning in 1991, 183 A-10s produced from production orders 
prior to FY78 were placed in long term storage at Davis Monthan AFB, and several others were 
retired to museums or converted to battle damage repair or maintenance trainers.  Attention now 
shifted to how the remaining A-10s would be sustained throughout their renewed service life.   
 
Figure 21. One of the Six A-10s Lost in Desert Storm.   
“Wheels up, hard stick landing.  Everyone said it couldn't be done, including the Flight Manual's 
and Tech Orders... pilot Capt Rich Biley proved'm wrong on 22 Feb 1991!  …  Capt Biley was 
unhurt during the crash.”108
 
  
 
                                                 
xxxvii Part of what made General McPeak’s recommendations more difficult to accept by the other services were the 
wide ranging impacts they would have had.  Beyond the changes in CAS and deep strike roles, he wanted the Army 
and the Navy out of the space and long range air defense business, and he recommended that the Marine turn their 
fixed wing F/A-18’s over to the Navy. 
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Figure 22. Repaired Aircraft 80-186 
This Aircraft was damaged on three separate occasions during Desert Storm, the last one 
resulting in approximately 300 holes.  The plane was repaired and continued to fly and fight.109
3.7.3 
 
Structural Integrity Issues and HOG UP 
The Air Force initiated the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) in 1958.  The 
intent was to monitor and evaluate the structural health of Air Force operated aircraft throughout 
their operational life, precluding structural failure of in-service aircraft attributable to fatigue.110
 
  
The governing Air Force Instruction, AFI-63-1001, requires the Air Force to have a plan for 
monitoring and evaluating the structural health of each type of aircraft in the operational 
inventory.  The general guidelines and technical details for the AFI are contained in MIL-
HDBK-1530.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the Air Force performed damage tolerance 
assessments and developed inspection and modification programs on every major aircraft system 
in order to maintain operational safety.  As part of the ASIP, fatigue tests were performed on the 
full aircraft as well as components such as the wing and fuselage.   
The A-10 was originally designed for 6,000 hours of use comprising a specified mix of 
operational weights, sortie types and maneuver loads.  The original design spectrum was used for 
the initial full-scale fatigue testing performed from 1975-1977.111
 
  The original test to two 
lifetimes (12,000 hours) was completed successfully with repairs in 1976.  Noting that other 
current aircraft were being designed for 8,000 hours service life, the fatigue test was continued 
with the intent of reaching two times the longer service life.  In 1977, after 13,768 Effective 
Flight Hours (EFH), cracks were observed at Wing Station (WS) 23 where the wing is joined to 
the fuselage.  The wing was repaired using extensive cold working of the lower wing center 
panel to improve the fatigue life.  The test was to resume, but a new design load spectrum, 
referred to as Spectrum 3, was adopted based on a 3,000 hour Loads/Environment Spectra 
Survey (L/ESS).  Spectrum 3, based on evidence of more severe fleet usage than originally 
predicted, was more severe than the original design spectrum.  Wing testing resumed in 1979 
under Spectrum 3, but was halted at 58% of Spectrum 3 service life due to several failures (and 
subsequent repairs) at both the left and right wing outer panels and finally the centerline WS 0.   
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There were several design changes that resulted from the full-scale fatigue testing using 
Spectrum 3.  The thickness of the lower skin on the wing outer panels was increased, and cold 
working was performed at the location of the fatigue test crack initiation.  The effectivity of this 
change was for production aircraft #442 and subsequent, but a tech order (TCTO-0952) was 
generated to inspect or reskin the lower wing outer panels of all previous production aircraft 
(production #’s 7-441).  TCTO-0952 was rescinded in 1986 with approximately 200 aircraft not 
having received the modification.  The wing center panel also underwent a redesign in order to 
withstand 8,000 hours of Spectrum 3 usage.  The redesign consisted of increasing the lower skin 
panel thickness and modifying the lower spar caps to accommodate the thicker wing skins.  The 
effectivity of the wing center panel redesign was production aircraft # 582 and subsequent.  Due 
to the extent of the wing center panel modification, no retrofit to earlier aircraft was 
economically feasible.  Cold working of the wing center panel at WS0 was also performed 
starting with production aircraft #530, and performed as a retrofit to earlier aircraft.  These 
modifications resulted in several structural configurations as shown in Table 11. 
 
A wing-only fatigue test was conducted on a configuration consisting of a cold worked 
wing center panel, a production left outer panel, and a retrofit right outer panel.  This wing was 
successfully tested to 12,000 EFH of Spectrum 3 with repairs between 1980 and 1988.  Having 
demonstrated two times the service life, the retrofit configuration wings were qualified for 6,000 
hours of Spectrum 3 usage.  The thick skin production wings were qualified for 8,000 hours.  
Fatigue testing of the forward fuselage and empennage was also conducted between 1980 and 
1986, demonstrating 17,500 EFH of Spectrum 3 usage on the forward fuselage, and over 19,000 
EFH of Spectrum 3 usage, with repairs, on the empennage.   
Table 11. A-10 Structural Configurations 
Retrofit WOP 
Configuration 
Intended for Aircraft 
7-441 (not completed 
on all aircraft) 
Thin wing center panel, cold worked at WS 0, 
Retrofit thick wing outer panel.  Qualified to 
6,000 hours Spectrum 3. 
Production 
WOP 
Aircraft 442-581 Thin wing center panel, cold worked at WS 0, 
Production thick wing outer panel.  Qualified 
to 6,000 hours Spectrum 3. 
Thick Skin 
Configuration 
Aircraft 582 and 
subsequent 
Production increased wing center panel and 
outer panel thickness.  Configuration qualified 
to 8,000 hour service life. 
 
The initial Damage Tolerance Assessment (DTA) for the A-10 was done by Fairchild in 
1980, and several re-assessments were done after that.  After the 1992 decision to keep the A-10 
in the inventory, Grumman Aerospace, who took over the A-10 program from Fairchild Republic 
in 1987, delivered an updated DTA.  The DTA analyzed 52 control points in the wing, and 
comparison between the 1980 and 1993 DTAs indicated that service lives were reduced on 8 of 
these control points after the later assessment.  The 1993 DTA and its associated Force Structural 
Maintenance Plan (FSMP) took into account the three different structural configurations for the 
A-10 (see Table 11).  Of greatest concern for the wing was the fuselage attachment joint at WS 
23 for the retrofit configurations (especially those that had not received the thick wing outer 
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panel retrofit prior to TCTO-0952 being rescinded).  Figure 23 shows how the FSMP was 
intended to influence procedures for inspection, repairs and modifications.  The -6 T.O. indicated 
in the figure refers to the Tech Order for Scheduled Inspections and Maintenance.  Generally 
following the guidelines in MIL-STD-1530A, the 1993 maintenance plan established inspection 
intervals based on service life and safety limits, and was intended to be accomplished as 
programmed inspections on all aircraft.   
 
xxxviii
The FSMP inspection requirements were not incorporated into the inspection and 
maintenance tech order (T.O. 1A-10A-6) and, therefore, not accomplished as intended.112   
The A-10 program office, by then part of the Air Logistics Center at McClellan AFB, CA, chose 
to perform the inspections using sampling as opposed to monitoring all aircraft.  The Analytical 
Condition Inspection (ACI) program contained some of the FSMP inspection locations, 
including the critical WS 23 location, but the inspections were conducted on relatively few 
aircraft as compared to the fleet wide inspections called out in the FSMP.  There were several 
factors contributing to the breakdown in the FSMP implementation.113  The A-10 did not utilize 
Programmed Depot Maintenance, so inspections would have to have been conducted in the field, 
and severe budget constraints were also cited.  Sometime in the mid 1990s the flight data 
recorder system, used to sample the fleet wide usage, became unsupportable and no longer 
yielded accurate data.  Even more disruptive was a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
decision in 1995 to close McClellan AFB and move the maintenance and repair operations to 
Hill AFB, UT.  By the time the BRAC decision was fully implemented in 2000, the SPO had lost 
80% of its experienced workforce.  Similar turnover was noted at the System Program Director 
and Chief Engineer level.  Grumman, which merged with Northrop in 1994 to form Northrop 
Grumman Corp., continued as the prime contractor for the A-10, but most modifications during 
this time were competed or done organically.  “Fallout funds were used to task NG to 
incorporate design changes into the configuration baseline drawings and perform system level 
analysis.”114  In 1997, the SPO competed the prime contract and subsequently awarded 
Lockheed Martin Systems Integration (LMSI), formerly IBM Federal Systems Division in 
Owego, NY, an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract to take over as the new 
prime for A-10.  It should be noted that LMSI was not an aircraft company and did not have the 
aircraft infrastructure available at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, TX or Marietta, GA locations.  
At the time, the SPO expected that Northrop Grumman would be part of the prime team since 
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman had proposed a merger in July of 1997.  In March of 
1998 the US Department of Justice moved to block the merger in federal district court, and the 
merger was subsequently called off in July of 1998.  As a result, Northrop-Grumman was 
diminished to a supporting role, and became further marginalized by Lockheed Martin’s use of 
Southwest Research Institute to provide structural analysis as part of the prime contract team.   
For the next six years, “the prime team consisted of organizations that had no direct experience 
or infrastructure developing, building, and supporting an entire aircraft.”115
 
  In late 2004, the Air 
Force “requested” that LMSI include Northrop Grumman as a member of the prime team, but 
Northrop’s participation would be limited to specific structures work for several more years. 
                                                 
xxxviii An Air Force Materiel Command Red Team in 2003 (see associated endnote) indicated “a systemic neglect of 
the A-10 weapon system after the initial retirement started in 1988”. 
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Figure 23. FSMP Establishes Required Maintenance Actions116
 
 
 The Analytical Condition Inspections conducted in 1995-96 discovered cracks in several 
wing locations due to fatigue.  Most of the cracks were consistent with the DTA crack growth 
curves updated in 1993, but two cracks at WS 23 were clearly under predicted by the low Initial 
Flaw Size (IFS) curve, and one of the cracks was of “near-critical” size (see Figure 24).  For 
reasons not determined by the Red Team Investigation in 2003, the SPO classified the cracks as 
minor and did not reconsider their implementation of the FSMP.117
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classification decision include avoidance of the disruption and burden associated with field 
inspections by operational units.   
 
Figure 24. WS 23 - DTA versus ACI Findings118
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 In 1998 Northrop Grumman was tasked to provide a cost effective structural 
enhancement program focusing on the most critical areas.119  In August 1998, they delivered a 
report entitled “A-10A Aircraft Wing Center Panel Rework-Fatigue Life Improvement”.  The 
plan detailed structural changes required to support a 16,000 hour service life.  The report 
recommended immediate implementation, and verification using a full-scale fatigue test on a 
modified wing.  This report formed the basis of the subsequent HOG UP program to extend the 
structural life to the year 2028, but the report was based on the assumption that the 1993 FSMP 
had been implemented.  Further, the report did not consider the impact of ACI crack data or new 
fatigue sensitive locations that had been identified by field inspections.  The SPO initiated the 
HOG UP program in 1999 as a repair program instead of a modification despite the fact that the 
majority of the parts for the repair were to be kitted, and the same configuration was to be 
applied to all thin-skinned wings.120  Managing HOG UP as a repair did not require acquisition 
approval, and maintenance funding could be used.  Since it was a “repair”, the SPO held that 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) action was not required, and “appropriate configuration 
control concerns, such as technical analysis of service life, technical contents of the program, and 
method to evaluate an organic or contractor prepared engineering change proposal did not 
occur.”121
 
   
 The HOG UP program expanded from its initial beginnings.  At the request of Air 
Combat Command, center wing fuel bladder replacement, rework of the flight control system, 
nacelle fitting inspections, and other areas were added to HOG UP.  Figure 25 shows a 
comparison of the 1999 and 2003 program.  All modifications were considered worthwhile, but 
the Red Team investigating the program in 2003 noted no composite estimate of the risk of 
structural failure had been generated and expressed concern that the repair might not result in the 
intended life extension.
xxxix
122  A further complicating factor had to do with the problematic cracks at 
WS 23.  In 2001 the WS 23 crack was reclassified as critical, and a new tech order (TCTO 1438) 
was issued for inspection of the wing center panel and WS 23 fastener holes.  Estimates in 2003 
were that 35 aircraft would require refurbished wings associated with the WS 23 repair.  
Although not originally part of HOG UP, the WS 23 inspection and repair was subsequently 
scheduled to be conducted concurrently with the expanded HOG UP repairs.   This touched 
off a series of problems due, in part, to longer than expected time to produce HOG UP wings, 
and higher number of unusable wings found as a result of the WS 23 inspection (they found 27 
bad wings they had not expected).  By the time the Red Team investigated the HOG UP 
program, it had grown from approximately $140M to over $600M, not including unprogrammed 
costs associated with the WS 23 wing refurbishment and associated remove and replace process.  
Further, the full-scale fatigue testxl to validate the HOG UP repair had not yet been done, leaving 
the Red Team to conclude that the actual structural condition of the fleet remained unknown, and 
the repair was “un-validated for extending the lives of A-10 wings to 2028 (~16,000 Hours).”123  
Several alternative approaches were offered by the Red Team, including the replacement of high-
time production center wings with previously considered inviolate wingsxli
                                                 
xxxix Both programs were essentially combined, and are often referred to as Service Life Extension Program 
(SLEP1). 
 or newly 
manufactured thick wing versions of the center wing.   
xl The fatigue-test was to be conducted over a three year time period, simulating 10 years of operational use. 
xli Wings classified as inviolate were “thin” wings with generally low service life in storage at Davis Monthan AFB. 
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Figure 25. Comparison of 1999 and 2003 HOG UP Program124
 
 
 Subsequent to the Red Team report in February 2003, the wing undergoing full-scale 
fatigue testing failed short of the 16,000 hour life expectancy.125  In addition, thin-skin wings 
coming into the depot were failing inspection at an increasingly higher rate, and it became clear 
that the Air Force would run out of serviceable wings by about 2011.126  By 2005 the failure rate 
of the thin center panel wings coming in for service life extension was averaging close to 30%.  
In 2005 the AF completed a business case analysis which considered three options for structural 
life extension.127  Option 1 consisted of organic sustainment of the thin skin wings.  It entailed 
salvaging and rebuilding WS 23 failures to eliminate shortfalls, and increasing the SLEP1 to 
extend the service life.  The estimated Life Cycle Cost (LCC) for Option 1 was $4.6B.  Option 2 
entailed purchasing 135 wings to replace the WS 23 failures, and increasing SLEP1 for the 
remaining wings.  The LCC for Option 2 was $3.16B.  Option 3 was to buy 242 wings to replace 
WS 23 failures and avoid the high cost of adding to the SLEP1.  The estimated LCC of Option 3 
was $1.72B.  A decision was made to pursue Option 3 based on clear cost avoidance associated 
with that option.  In early 2006, the Air Force prepared a budget justification for production of 
newly manufactured “thick skin” wings to re-wing the remaining “thin skin” A-10s in the 
inventory.128  The budget estimate was $741M for replacing up to 121 wings, with the intention 
that 242 wings would be replaced between 2012 and 2018.  Also in the budget justification was 
approximately $5M to build a computer model capturing the most current configuration of the  
A-10 wing assembly to support future sustainment operations.  This became necessary, in part, to 
duplicate the as-built configuration as opposed to the as-designed.  This also allowed the SPO to 
compete the contract for new wings, an important consideration due to the absence of an Original 
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Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  In the end, Aerospace Engineering Spectrum LLC would be 
awarded the contract to build a computer model for a wing that would be manufactured by 
Boeing (the winner of the new wing contract in 2007).  The wing would be installed on an 
aircraft built by Fairchild Republic, for which Lockheed Martin was now the prime.xlii
3.7.4 A Second Life for a Modern Day Hog 
  This was 
the new reality of sustainment for the A-10. 
Prior to, and coincident with the HOG UP program, several other upgrade programs were 
addressing other aspects of the A-10 weapon system.  In the early 1990s, the aircraft was 
modified to incorporate the Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancements (LASTE) system.  
This system added ground collision avoidance warnings, an Enhanced Attitude Control (EAC) 
function for aircraft stabilization during gunfire, a low altitude autopilot system, and computed 
weapon delivery solutions for targeting improvements. The LASTE system also added an 
Operational Flight Program (OFP) to provide the computer control software necessary to 
perform the above functions.  Starting in 1999, the A-10 was upgraded with the installation of an 
Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (EGI).  The EGI system 
provides improved navigation and situational awareness.  Perhaps the most significant upgrade 
was the Precision Engagement (PE) program awarded to Lockheed Martin in 2005.  This 
program, which results in the modified aircraft being redesignated as A-10Cs (see Figure 26), 
includes enhanced precision target engagement capabilities.  The A-10Cs are able to carry the 
INS/GPS guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the Wind Corrected Munitions 
Dispenser (WCMD).  Other modifications in the PE upgrade include hands-on throttle and stick 
control, new multi-function cockpit displays, situational awareness data links, digital stores 
management, integrated flight and fire control computer, LITENING II and Sniper laser 
targeting pod carriage, and a new armament HUD control panel.  Flight testing of an A-10C 
prototype began in 2005, and as of January 2008 the 100th A-10C conversion had been 
delivered.129
 
  The PE upgrade is intended to evolve the A-10 from its origins as a cold-war tank 
killer, to an aircraft capable of performing a wide range of operations to support the Global War 
on Terror and other contingencies.  As of the date for this case study (2008), programs for 
replacement of the TF-34 engine with a higher thrust model have been formulated but not yet 
funded.  With the combination of the PE upgrade and the re-winging of the thin skin production 
aircraft, the Air Force has committed itself to sustaining the A-10 for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
xlii At the request of the government, Northrop Grumman became part of the prime team with Lockheed Martin in 
2005. 
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Figure 26. A Newly Modified A-10C 
 
 
62 
 
4 Summary 
The A-10 aircraft had an inauspicious beginning for an Air Force that many have 
suggested only wanted the aircraft to keep the Army from taking over the CAS mission.  The Air 
Force always believed that a fast multi-role fighter was a better choice for the feared war in 
Europe, but agreed to procure the A-10 for contingencies and “limited wars” like Vietnam.  For 
its part, the Army seemed to like the A-10 as long as it did not threaten its own development of 
attack helicopters, and on several occasions the A-10 did pose a political threat to continued 
funding for those helicopters.  Despite these challenges, the Air Force did embrace development 
of the A-10 and produced a specialized CAS aircraft that would prove effective in a variety of 
operations throughout the world (fortunately for mankind in the 20th
 
 century, a shooting war 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact never erupted, and it never became necessary to prove the 
A-10’s mettle against the armies and air forces of Eastern Europe).  Close attention to key 
mission characteristics (lethality, survivability, responsiveness, and simplicity) allowed the 
concept formulation and subsequent system design to result in an effective CAS aircraft, and 
design-to-cost goals kept the government and contractor focused on meeting the critical 
requirements at an affordable cost.  The A-10 did not meet all its cost goals, but it came much 
closer to them than most major defense development programs did in that time frame or since 
then.   
There were many aspects of the A-10 program that were unique for its day.  It was a 
design-to-cost program when most other aircraft programs were clearly putting performance 
first.  It was the first major defense program to embrace the newly favorable competitive 
prototyping approach to allow a source selection decision to be made on the basis of 
demonstrated performance and maturity of the design.  It may be the only aircraft program ever 
designed around the armament (the GAU-8/A gun system), and it was unique in how it managed 
the development of the gun and its associated ammunition as part of the overall A-10 program.  
Both the A-10 and its gun were forced to prove themselves in multiple comparative “fly-offs”, 
and even more “fly-offs” were threatened but never materialized.  While not unique to the A-10, 
it should be noted that many of the same political challenges that accompanied the inception of 
the A-10 never went away and continue to challenge the A-10’s existence today.  
 
Alas, no program is perfect, and the A-10 provides no exceptions to that observation.  
Overlooked problems associated with production readiness and contractor financial stability did 
not go away and had to be resolved far too late in the development program.  More significantly, 
the original structural design proved inadequate for the design life, and even fixes during 
production were inadequate for all but the latest aircraft produced.  This problem was 
compounded by loss of the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), on-again/off-again 
decisions to retire the A-10, unstable funding for inspection and repair, and major personnel 
disruptions resulting from a BRAC decision.  Critical “health of the fleet” structural inspections 
were not performed during sustainment, and a subsequent repair program failed to provide the 
desired level of life extension.  Despite these problems, the A-10, with precision engagement 
upgrades and new wings in production, appears to be back on track for a life extension that will 
double its service life and keep it flying until 2028. 
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Appendix A: Friedman-Sage Matrix with A-10 Learning 
Principles  
 
 Concept Domain Responsibility Domain 
  1. Contractor 
Responsibility 
2. Shared Responsibility 3. Government 
Responsibility 
A. Requirements Definition 
and   Management 
 LP-1: The system concept 
and preliminary design 
must follow, not precede, 
the mission analysis. 
LP1 
B. Systems Architecture 
and Conceptual Design 
 LP1 LP6: If the politics 
don’t fly, the system 
never will. 
C System and Subsystem 
Detailed Design and 
Implementation 
 LP1  
D. Systems Integration and 
Interface  
  LP-3: Clear lines of 
responsibility must be 
established to ensure 
successful integration, 
especially when 
multiple programs are 
involved. 
E. Validation and 
Verification 
   
F. Deployment and Post 
Deployment  
  LP-5: Successful 
design, development 
and production is not 
enough to sustain a 
system throughout its 
life cycle. 
G. Life Cycle Support LP-4: The government 
must ensure the 
contractor is able to 
“Walk the Talk” when it 
comes to production. 
 LP5 
H.  Risk Assessment and 
Management  
  LP-2: Prototyping can 
be used to help manage 
technical and cost risk 
at the system, 
subsystem, and 
component level; LP4 
I. System and Program 
Management  
 LP4  
 
For discussion of the Learning Principles, the reader is referred to the Executive Summary for 
this case study. 
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Dr. David Jacques (LtCol, USAF-Ret) is currently a faculty member at the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) where he chairs the graduate Systems Engineering program and 
was instrumental in the establishment and activation of the Air Force Center for Systems 
Engineering.  During over 24 years of combined military and civil service he has had 
assignments spanning tactical missile intelligence analysis, ballistic missile test and evaluation, 
and research and development of advanced munition concepts.  He has twice received AF level 
recognition for his work; in 1998 for Outstanding Contributions to USAF Research and 
Development, and in 2002 as an Air Force Outstanding Science and Engineering Educator.  Dr. 
Jacques teaches in both the Systems and Aeronautical Engineering programs at AFIT, and 
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Armored Cavalry serving as a platoon leader, staff officer, and troop commander in Europe, 
Korea and in CONUS.  He is a graduate of the Army Command and Staff College, entitled to 
wear the Ranger Tab and has a real appreciation for the role of CAS in combat. Upon leaving 
active duty he served with the reserves and was a Lt. Col. upon discharge.  Dr. Strouble practiced 
law as a trial attorney in Texas prior to beginning a teaching career.  He has taught at The 
Pennsylvania State University, Bowling Green State University, and the University of Dallas, 
Graduate School.  He has an undergraduate degree in Management from The Pennsylvania State 
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Appendix C: Tactical Air Control System – circa 1968*
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-1. The Tactical Air Control System (circa 1968) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* A-X Concept Formulation Package, Control # RT-370, Department of the Air Force, 1 March 
1968, Revised 13 May 1968. 
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Appendix D: Concept Formulation Trade Space Analysis†
Combat Radius and Loiter Time Considerations 
 
 
 
Figure D-1. Radius Req’d for 90-Percent Geo-Area Coverage from Available Runways 
 
 
Figure D-2. Response Time Versus Mission Radii and Cruise Speed 
                                                 
† A-X Concept Formulation Package, Control # RT-370, Department of the Air Force, 1 March 
1968, Revised 13 May 1968. 
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Figure D-3. Impact of Loiter Time and Sortie Rate on Force Requirements 
 
 
Figure D-4. Maintenance Man-Hours per Flying Hour for USAF Fighters 
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Survivability 
 
 
 
Figure D-5. Anti-Aircraft Weapons (Field Forces) 
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Figure D-6. Ground Fire Attrition in South Vietnam and Laos 
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Figure D-7. Cause of Aircraft Ground Fire Loss in Southeast Asia 
 
 
Figure D-8. Relative Aircraft Attrition Versus Velocity and Maneuver 
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Figure D-9. Time and Space Required for Re-Attack Minimum time Trajectory 
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Weather Suitability 
 
Figure D-10. Availability of Weather Suitable for CAS Operations 
 
 
Figure D-11. Attack Profile Nomogram 
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Comparison of Candidate Aircraft Characteristics and Cost Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure D-12. Useful Load Versus Takeoff Ground Roll Distance 
 
 
Figure D-13. Useful Load Versus Landing Ground Roll Distance 
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Figure D-14. Payload Versus Loiter Time 
 
 
Figure D-15. Ordnance Payload Versus Loiter Time 
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Figure D-16. Candidate Comparison Ordnance Capacity 
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Appendix E: Concept Formulation – Candidate Configurations‡ 
 
                                                 
‡ A-X Concept Formulation Package, Control # RT-370, Department of the Air Force, 1 March 
1968, Revised 13 May 1968. 
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Appendix F: Proposed A-X Configurations§ 
 
                                                 
§ Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council Briefing, A-X Specialized Close Air Support Aircraft, 17 December 
1970. 
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Appendix G: Air Force Fact Sheet 
 
U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet 
A-10/OA-10 THUNDERBOLT II 
 
Mission 
A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt IIs have excellent 
maneuverability at low air speeds and 
altitude, and are highly accurate weapons-
delivery platforms. They can loiter near battle 
areas for extended periods of time and 
operate under 1,000-foot ceilings (303.3 
meters) with 1.5-mile (2.4 kilometers) 
visibility. Their wide combat radius and short 
takeoff and landing capability permit 
operations in and out of locations near front 
lines. Using night vision goggles, A-10/OA-10 
pilots can conduct their missions during 
darkness.  
 
Thunderbolt IIs have Night Vision Imaging Systems, or NVIS, goggle compatible single-seat 
cockpits forward of their wings and a large bubble canopy which provides pilots all-around 
vision. The pilots are protected by titanium armor that also protects parts of the flight-control 
system. The redundant primary structural sections allow the aircraft to enjoy better survivability 
during close air support than did previous aircraft.  
 
The aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high explosive projectiles up to 
23mm. Their self-sealing fuel cells are protected by internal and external foam. Manual 
systems back up their redundant hydraulic flight-control systems. This permits pilots to fly and 
land when hydraulic power is lost.  
 
The Thunderbolt II can be serviced and operated from bases with limited facilities near battle 
areas. Many of the aircraft's parts are interchangeable left and right, including the engines, 
main landing gear and vertical stabilizers.  
 
Avionics equipment includes multi-band communications; Global Positioning System and 
inertial navigations systems; infrared and electronic countermeasures against air-to-air and air-
to-surface threats. And, it has a Pave Penny laser spot tracker system; a heads-up display to 
display flight and weapons delivery information; and a low altitude safety and targeting 
enhancement system, which provides constantly computed impact and release points for 
accurate ordnance delivery. There is also a low-altitude autopilot and a ground collision 
avoidance system.  
 
The A-10 is currently undergoing the precision engagement modification, which adds upgraded 
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cockpit displays, moving map, hands on throttle and stick, digital stores management, 
LITENING and Sniper advanced targeting pod integration, situational awareness data link or 
SADL, GPS-guided weapons, and upgraded DC power. Precision engagement modified 
aircraft are designated as the A-10C.  
 
The Thunderbolt II can employ a wide variety of conventional munitions, including general 
purpose bombs, cluster bomb units, laser guided bombs, joint direct attack munitions or 
JDAM), wind corrected munitions dispenser or WCMD, AGM-65 Maverick and AIM-9 
Sidewinder missiles, rockets, illumination flares, and the GAU-8/A 30mm cannon, capable of 
firing 3,900 rounds per minute to defeat a wide variety of targets including tanks. 
 
Background 
The first production A-10A was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz., in October 
1975. It was designed specially for the close air support mission and had the ability to combine 
large military loads, long loiter and wide combat radius, which proved to be vital assets to the 
United States and its allies during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Noble Anvil. 
 
The upgraded A-10C reached initial operation capability in September 2007. Specifically 
designed for close air support, its combination of large and varied ordnance load, long loiter 
time, accurate weapons delivery, austere field capability, and survivability has proven 
invaluable to the United States and its allies. The aircraft has participated in operations Desert 
Storm, Southern Watch, Provide Comfort, Desert Fox, Noble Anvil, Deny Flight, Deliberate 
Guard, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.. 
 
General Characteristics 
Primary Function: A-10 -- close air support, OA-10 - airborne forward air control 
Contractor: Fairchild Republic Co. 
Power Plant: Two General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbofans 
Thrust: 9,065 pounds each engine 
Wingspan: 57 feet, 6 inches (17.42 meters)  
Length: 53 feet, 4 inches (16.16 meters) 
Height: 14 feet, 8 inches (4.42 meters) 
Weight: 29,000 pounds (13,154 kilograms) 
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 51,000 pounds (22,950 kilograms)  
Fuel Capacity: 11,000 pounds (7,257 kilograms) 
Payload: 16,000 pounds (7,257 kilograms) 
Speed: 420 miles per hour (Mach 0.56) 
Range: 800 miles (695 nautical miles)  
Ceiling: 45,000 feet (13,636 meters) 
Armament: One 30 mm GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 
kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage pylon stations, 
including 500 pound (225 kilograms) Mk-82 and 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) Mk-84 series 
low/high drag bombs, incendiary cluster bombs, combined effects munitions, mine dispensing 
munitions, AGM-65 Maverick missiles and laser-guided/electro-optically guided bombs; 
infrared countermeasure flares; electronic countermeasure chaff; jammer pods; 2.75-inch (6.99 
centimeters) rockets; illumination flares and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. 
Crew: One 
Unit Cost: Not available 
Initial operating capability: A-10A, 1977; A-10C, 2007 
Inventory: Active force, A-10, 143 and OA-10, 70; Reserve, A-10, 46 and OA-10, 6; ANG, A-
10, 84 and OA-10, 18 
 
Point of Contact 
Air Combat Command, Public Affairs Office; 130 Andrews St., Suite 202; Langley AFB, VA 
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23665-1987; DSN 574-5007 or 757-764-5007; e-mail: accpa.operations@langley.af.mil 
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